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INTRODUCTION

E QUAL protection's

rationality review has two faces. In most
cases, its presumption of constitutionality and deference to
legislative judgment lead to a purely formalistic review. Occasionally, however, the United States Supreme Court has used rationality review to monitor closely the purposes a legislature
sought to advance and has found those purposes impermissible.
In both situations, the Court has overlooked difficulties with the
idea of legislative purpose and treated the notion of impermissibility as self-evident. On the few occasions where the Court has
squarely faced these issues, the Justices were in substantial disagreement. The result of this abbreviated analysis and judicial
conflict is an inconsistent and unpredictable body of case law.
This Article will examine the concept of permissible legislative
purpose in the context of equal protection's rationality review.I
1. For earlier treatments of some of the areas covered in this Article, see
generally Robert W. Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in ConstitutionalLaw: JudicialReview and Democratic Theory, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1049 (1979) (examining meaning behind rationality requirement and legislative purpose requirement and defending
requirement in this context provided its use is consistent and sensible); Scott H.
Bice, RationalityAnalysis in ConstitutionalLaw, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980) (discuss-
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II.

WHAT IS LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE?

Do laws have purposes? Rationality review necessarily includes a presumption that they do. The requirement that a classification be rationally related to the purpose of the law lacks
foundation unless there is some legislative purpose apart from
the terms of the law itself.2 This distinction must precede any required connection between classification and purpose. Why
should we suppose, however, that laws are enacted for some reason? This section examines the notion of legislative purpose and
some of the problems associated with that notion.
A.

The Nature of Legislative Purpose

This Article uses the term "legislative purpose" to mean "the
end at which a law is directed." 3 The purpose of a law is the "pre4
ferred future" sought by the legislature in enacting the law.
ing whether an intelligible national basis standard can be constructed, and if so,
what normative functions standard would serve); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 251 (1976) (addressing "what 'due process' can
sensibly mean as a constitutional standard for lawmaking," and critiquing rationality requirement at earlier legislative stage rather than testing its feasibility as
tool of judicial review); Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really
Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 488, 506 (1979) (analyzing "the possibility of a normative economic theory of constitutional adjudication," author concludes that rationality review could be appropriate in society
of political institutions focused on economic goals; noting, however, that "[o]ur
troubles about rationality review are a clue that economics does not for us provide the whole truth about the value of politics"); Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values,
Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 127, 128 [hereinafter Sunstein, Public Values] (suggesting "that the law of equal protection is
not self-contradictory, but a more or less principled response to a more or less
unitary understanding of what the Equal Protection Clause is about"); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE LJ. 123, 128 (1972)
("[T]he traditional equal protection rationality test applied in these cases is invariably an empty requirement and a misleading analytic device."); Melanie E.
Meyers, Note, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 1184, 1209 (1986) ("By focusing on the treatment of groups through governmental classification rather than on group identity, impermissible purpose
analysis suggests a unitary principle condemning governmental accommodation
of societal prejudice."); Brenda Swierenga, Note, Still Newer Equal Protection: Inpermissible Purpose Review in the 1984 Term, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1454, 1455 (1986)
(considering "the Court's new willingness to reject certain legislative purposes
as impermissible under the equal protection clause").
2. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40
(1973) ("A century of Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection
Clause affirmatively supports the application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the state's system be shown to bear some rational
relationship to legitimate state purposes.").
3. Cf Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia,J., dissenting)
("[i1t is possible to discern the objective 'purpose' of a statute (i.e., the public
good at which its provisions appear to be directed) ....").
4. See Linde, supra note 1, at 223. Linde stated:
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Thus, the legislative purpose may be "either the elimination of a
public 'mischief' or the achievement of some positive public
good." 5 Defined in this way, legislative purpose is not something
that exists in the minds of the legislators, either individually or as
a collective body. Itexists, rather, as an objective concept, "evident in the character of the [law] itself," as an end to be
achieved. 6 For example, the end, or purpose, of a razor is for
shaving. We need not ask the maker of the razor what was in her
mind when she made the razor in order to understand its
7
purpose.
This understanding of legislative purpose is not without its
problems. 8 The attempt here, however, has been to define "purpose" without reference to the minds of individual legislators and
without speaking of the legislature as if it had a collective mind. It
is important to separate the motives of individual legislators from
the legislative purpose. 9 It is also important to realize that while
it is acceptable to approach legislative purpose from the perspective of the collective body rather than from the end to be
achieved, we need not find the mind that is doing the seeking but
merely the end that is to be accomplished. I0
A rational policy must be one that is designed to move events toward
some goal. At a minimum, therefore, it requires three elements: some
knowledge of present conditions; the identification of a preferred future, or a goal; and a belief that the proposed action will contribute to
achieving the desired goal, a belief that is sometimes called the instrumental hypothesis.
Id.
5. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949); see also Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638
(K.B. 1584) (when interpreting statute, court should ask: "What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide[?]").
6. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). If "purpose" existed only in the legislators' minds, then "purpose would be indistinguishable from the intention, and we should have the same difficulty already
noted, that this purpose is practically undiscoverable and would be irrelevant if
discovered." Id. at 875.
7. See id. ("In the case of statutes also, it is rare indeed that we can not say
positively what any particular statute is for, by reading it .... But as a matter of
fact, can we be quite so sure about it? . . .[N]early every end is a means to
another end."). For a further discussion of the incoherent nature of legislative
purpose, see infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the principal problems in the concept of legislative
purpose, see infra notes 36-89 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the need for separation between individual motives
and legislative purpose, see infra notes 42-68 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of approaching legislative purpose from the collective
legislative mind, see infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
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B.

The Terminology of Legislative Purpose

This section considers the terms that are used to refer to the
subject at hand. Principally, those terms are: "legislative purpose," "legislative motive" and "legislative intent." Although attempts have been made to stake out different territories for these
terms, these attempts have been generally unsuccessful and, in
any case, have been ignored by the courts.
1. Legislative Purpose and Legislative Motive
Two different attempts have been made to distinguish legislative purpose from legislative motive. Under the first formulation, "purpose" is an objective, collective concept and is
identified through "the terms of the statute, its operation, and
[its] context."" The term "motive" is saved for the subjective
motivations of individual legislators.' 2 This distinction between
objective, legislative purpose and subjective motives of individual
legislators continues to be important and valid.' 3 In practice,
however, courts often use both terms interchangeably.' 4 Consequently, despite the value of the distinction in theory, its meaning
becomes lost in practice.
In part, the attempt at distinction was probably a response to
the United States Supreme Court's assertions that legislative motivation was in and of itself irrelevant to constitutional adjudication.' 5 A successful differentiation between purpose and motive,
then, could save "purpose" while still giving effect to the Court's
11. Note, Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1091 (1969) ("[T]he 'purpose' of a measure is generally only a legal abstraction
attributed to the statute by the courts; it denotes the permissible objective which
the legislature might have had in enacting the statute."); see also Iram Heyman,
The ChiefJustice, Racial Segregation and the Friendly Critics, 49 CAL. L. REv. 104, 11516 (1961) (arguing that purpose of segregation statutes-to create and maintain
inferior status for blacks-has nothing to do with legislative "motive" and is
susceptible to judicial scrutiny).
12. Heyman, supra note 11, at 115-16; Note, supra note 11, at 1091-92.
13. For a discussion of the need for a distinction between individual motives and legislative purpose, see infra notes 42-68 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Actual purpose is sometimes unknown. Moreover, undue emphasis on actual motivation may result in identically worded statutes being held valid in one State and invalid in a neighboring State." (emphasis
added)); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("Inquiries into
Congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter." (emphasis added)).
15. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) ("[T]here is an element
of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of
its supporters. If the law is struck down for this reason,., it would presumably
be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons."); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 384 ("What motivates one legislator to

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. I

rejection of motivation. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme
Court, however, suggest that this distinction is no longer necessary. The Court has expressly retreated from its position that legislative motive is irrelevant.' 6 This development casts enough
doubt on the distinction between motive and purpose to make it
unworkable as a tool to understand constitutional adjudication.
The second attempt to distinguish between purpose and motive considers the immediacy of legislative aims. It seems that
"purposes" are immediate aims while "motives" are more distant
but intended results.' 7 This distinction simply does not work and
"has properly been put to rest."' 8 The difficulties inherent in the
attempt to make this distinction are exemplified in a Note in the
Harvard Law Review.' 9 The Note discusses a case, Deerfield Park
District v. Progress Development Corp.,20 in which a municipal board
condemned certain land for use as a public park as soon as the
board discovered that a developer was about to construct an integrated housing development on the property. The Note explains:
The conflict between motive and purpose was thus
sharply drawn; the condemned land was to be used for a
park (the purpose of the action), but the reason that the
land was condemned was allegedly to prevent residential
integration (the board's motive). The Supreme Court of
Illinois declined to examine the board's motive and upheld the condemnation.... This conclusion would seem
2
correct. 1
It is doubtful that the "sharply drawn" distinction between
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others
to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.").
16. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 (1976) (indicating that Palmer
had not "worked a fundamental change in equal protection law" (footnote omitted)). For a further discussion of the relevance of legislative motive, see infra
notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
17. Heyman, supra note 11, at 115-16, cited critically in John H. Ely, Legislative
and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1219 (1970)
("There is of course a rough difference between those things a person intends to
result immediately from his act, and other more distant and less certain, but
nonetheless intended, results. But aims are immediate or distant only in relation
to other aims .... ); Note, supra note 11, at 1091-95, 1100-01 (discussing identification of discriminatory purpose legislatures might have in enacting statutes,
noting that process of finding purpose and motive might overlap).
18. Ely, supra note 17, at 1217-21, noted in Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson:
An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV.
95, 104.
19. Note, supra note 11, at 1100-01.
20. 174 N.E.2d 850 (Ill. 1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 968 (1962).
21. Note, supra note 11, at 1100-01.
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motive and purpose is as clear to most readers as it was to the
writer of the Note. The discriminatory effect of the condemnation, in combination with the sequence of events leading up to it,
provide strong evidence of racially discriminatory purpose forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause. 22 Legislative motive and
purpose therefore fail to be adequately distinguished under this
second formulation as well.
It seems clear, then, that there is no accepted and usable distinction between the terms "legislative purpose" and "legislative
motive." The next section examines another attempt to craft a
workable distinction in terminology-this time, between "legislative purpose" and "legislative intent."
2.

Legislative Purpose and Legislative Intent

In the context of race and gender discrimination, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that only intentionally discriminatory actions are forbidden, and not those acts that merely have
a discriminatory effect. 23 "Proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause." ' 24 As the cited passage illustrates, the Court uses the
terms "purpose" and "intent" interchangeably. 2 5 The terms are
interchangeable, however, only when "intent" is used in one of its
26
two senses.
The question of legislative intent is often controlling when
issues of statutory construction arise. In this context, "intent"
means "meaning"-that is, "what do the words of the statute
mean?" 27 Does a statute that excludes "vehicles" from the park
22. For a discussion of the use of statements made by individual legislators,
see infra notes 154-64, 165-73 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 (1976).
24. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977) (emphasis added). The Court continued: "Although some
contrary indications may be drawn from some of our cases, the holding in Davis
reaffirmed a principle well-established in a variety of contexts." Id. (footnote
omitted).
25. Id.; see also Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981)
("[T]he fact that the California Legislature criminalized the act of illicit sexual
intercourse with a minor female is a sure indication of its intent or purpose to
discourage that conduct." (emphasis added)); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("[T]he differentiating factor between dejure segregation
and so-called defacto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate.").
26. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). The Court noted
that "[d]iscriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration," while
" '[d]iscriminatory purpose' . . . implies more than intention as volition or intent
as awareness of consequences." Id. at 277, 279 (emphasis added).
27. See James M. Landis, A Note On "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L.
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mean to exclude bicycles, roller skates and toy automobiles? 28 In
this context, statutory intent is quite a different thing from legislative purpose. In constitutional adjudication, however, the intent
of the legislature is important not to determine what the legislature meant, but rather to determine what the legislature was trying to accomplish. Thus a facially neutral statute enacted with an
intent to promote racial discrimination is unconstitutional.2 9 In
this second sense, then, legislative purpose and legislative intent
are synonymous.
The argument could be made, however, that it is incorrect to
equate the discriminatory intent or purpose discussed in Washington v. Davis3 0 with the legislative purpose of rationality review. It

must be conceded that the two purposes arise in different contexts. A court is far more likely to look closely at evidence of an
alleged racially discriminatory purpose than to credit assertions
of impermissible purpose in other contexts. 3 ' In both cases, nevertheless, a reviewing court is attempting to answer the same
question-"At what end was the law directed?" The racially discriminatory purpose that is forbidden in Washington v. Davis is really only one type of impermissible purposes forbidden by
32
rationality review.
3.

Summary

The nomenclature involved in the area of legislative purpose
is misleading at best. To a significant degree, conceptual distinctions cannot be made between legislative purpose and the terms
legislative motive and intent, respectively. In practice, any worthREV. 886, 888 (1930) ("Intent is unfortunately a confusing word, carrying within
it both the teleological concept of purpose and the more immediate concept of
meaning .... ").
28. This example is taken from H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958).
29. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) ("[R]acial discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose has
been a motivating factor in the decision . . . judicial deference is no longer
justified.").
30. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (reaffirming requirement of discriminatory
purpose behind statute for it to be invalidated under Equal Protection Clause).
31. Under rationality review, the Court will frequently defer to hypothesized purposes, rather than look for evidence of actual purpose. For a discussion of hypothetical purpose, see infra notes 103-23 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Burstyn v. City of Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.
Fla. 1987) (utilizing rational basis analysis; citing Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) to explain what evidence
was relevant to identification of legislative purpose).
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while distinctions are lost mainly due to the courts' use of the
terms interchangeably. Accordingly, this Article will use only the
term "legislative purpose." This term will be used to include the
terms "motive" or "intent," discussed above, and also the less
35
frequently used terms "goal," 3 3 "objective" 3 4 and "interest."
C.

The Coherence of the Idea of Legislative Purpose

Sixty years ago, Max Radin argued that the very idea of legislative purpose was incoherent.3 6 In recent years, public choice
theorists have vigorously renewed that argument.3 7 Legislative
purpose is said to be incoherent on the following grounds:
1. A legislature does not have a mind that could form a
38
purpose;
39
2. A multi-member body cannot have a single intent;
3. The purpose of a particular law can be identified, variously, at different levels of generality; 40 and
4. Laws frequently have more than one purpose. 4 '
33. See, e.g.,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982) ("[Tlhe discrimination
...can hardly be considered rational unless itfurthers some substantial goal of
the State.").
34. See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982) ("The last of the
State's objectives ... is not a legitimate state purpose.").
35. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
440 (1985) ("The general rule is that Legislation is presumed to be valid and
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.").
36. Radin, supra note 6, at 870. Radin stated:
The least reflection makes clear that the law maker ... does not exist,
and only worse confusion follows when in his place there are substituted the members of the legislature as a body. A legislature certainly
has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or
three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have had, and
often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.
Id. (footnote omitted).
37. For a discussion of the public choice model of legislative behavior and
its conclusions about legislative purpose, see infra notes 50-63, 264-73 and accompanying text.
38. For a discussion of the need for a "mind" to form a purpose, see infra
notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
39. For a discussion of the lack of a single intent in legislatures, see infra
notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of the varying levels of purpose, see infra notes 69-75
and accompanying text.
41. For a discussion of the multi-purpose nature of laws, see infra notes 7689 and accompanying text.
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1. The Necessity of a Mind
Consider first the claim that a legislature cannot have a purpose because it does not have a mind. 4 2 This argument includes a
presumption that only a living, thinking actor is capable of forming a purpose. Its proponents assume that wherever there is a
purpose, there must be an agent to whom purpose can be attributed. 4 3 Because a legislature does not have a mind, per se, it follows under this view that ascribing purpose to a law is a mistaken
projection of mind into a mindless entity. There are two responses to this objection to the concept of legislative purpose.
First, the term "purpose" is not limited to the connotation
suggested in the previous paragraph. Rather than necessarily implicating an underlying mind, "purpose" can mean "the end at
which something is directed." 4 4 In this sense, "consciousness is
not an essential feature of purposefulness itself."4 5 Thus, "a razor is something to shave with, and we should know this without
the least speculation as to the ideas which were in the manufacturer's mind when the razor was made."' 46 Purpose does exist
apart from a thinking mind.
Second, even if, contrary to the thrust of this Article, we were
to concede the claim that purposes can be formed only by thinking entities, the idea of legislative purpose would still be useful as
a metaphor. We speak of the legislature in human terms because
doing so provides a helpful analogy between purposive human
behavior and purposive legislative activity. It makes sense, and is
often legally important, to ask why a person acted in a certain
way. 4 7 Similarly, it makes sense to speak of the legislature in that
same way, and ask why the legislature enacted a law. The same
action, whether of a person or of a legislature, will receive different legal treatment depending on the intent with which it was
42. See Bennett, supra note 1, at 1071 ("The concept of 'purpose,' even
more than that of rationality, presumes individual intelligence."); Gerald C.
MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 764 (1966) ("Legislation is a
group activity and it is impossible to conceive a group mind or cerebration."

(quoting

ALBERT KOCOUREK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW

201

(1930)).

43. See, e.g.,

JONATHAN LEAR, ARISTOTLE:

THE DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND

41

(1988).
44. For a discussion of the nature of legislative purpose, see supra notes 310 and accompanying text.
45. LEAR, supra note 43, at 41.
46. Radin, supra note 6, at 875-76.
47. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 13 (1934) (actor liable to another for
battery only if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact).
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done. 48 This practice of ascribing purpose to a nonliving entity is
not without precedent in our legal system. The law treats a corporation as a single entity, capable of forming a single intent. Yet
the corporation is purely a legal entity that can only act through
its agents-the board, officers and employees. 4 9 Similarly, a legislature's purpose in enacting a law can exist independently from
an individual or collective legislative mind. Therefore, criticism
of legislative purpose analysis due to the lack of a legislative mind
is groundless.
2.

The Sum of the Parts as a Single Entity

No one doubts that individual legislators have motives when
they cast their vote. It follows, then, that there may be as many
motives for a law as there are legislators who voted for it.5O If
legislative purpose is the mere aggregation of the motivations of
individual legislators, then there seems no escaping the conclusion that the very idea of legislative purpose is incoherent. Is it
48. See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 137 (1980) ("[T]he
very same governmental action can be constitutional or unconstitutional depending on why it was undertaken.").
49. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact-FindingModel of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1341
(1990) ("As with a legislature, the hundreds of individuals that form a corporation cannot be said to have a single intent. Still, corporations are routinely convicted of crimes which include intent as an element of the offense." (footnote
omitted)).
50. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia stated:
The number of possible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or
indeed, even finite. In the present case, for example, a particular legislator need not have voted for the Act either because he wanted to foster
religion or because he wanted to improve education. He may have
thought the bill would provide jobs for his district, or may have wanted
to make amends with a faction of his party he had alienated on another
vote, or he may have been a close friend of the bill's sponsor, or he may
have been repaying a favor he owed the majority leader, or he may have
hoped the Governor would appreciate his vote and make a fundraising
appearance for him, or he may have been pressured to vote for a bill he
disliked by a wealthy contributor or by a flood of constituent mail, or he
may have been seeking favorable publicity, or he may have been reluctant to hurt the feelings of a loyal staff member who worked on the bill,
or he may have been settling an old score with a legislator who opposed
the bill, or he may have been mad at his wife who opposed the bill, or
he may have been intoxicated and utterly unmotivated when the vote
was called, or he may have accidentally voted "yes" instead of "no" or,
of course, he may have had (and very likely did have) a combination of
some of the above and many other motivations. To look for the sole
purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that
does not exist.
Id. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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necessary to determine the motives only of those who voted in
favor of a bill? Only of those necessary to constitute a majority?5"
Which ones of those necessary to constitute a majority? Is it suffi52
cient to consider only the motives of the median legislator?
What if only one, or three, or exactly half of the votes necessary
53
for a majority were cast by legislators with improper motives?
Although it is often assumed that legislative purpose is composed
of the purposes of individual legislators, those holding that view
have not provided satisfactory answers to the questions just
posed. In fact, the assertion that individual motives are determinative as to legislative purpose is used as a premise to support the
conclusion that a composite body cannot have a single intent and
54
thus that the idea of legislative purpose is incoherent.
This claim that legislative purpose consists of the motives of
legislators is an old one, 5 5 but in recent years public choice theo51. See, e.g., Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, supra
note 1, at 142 ("How is a court to determine which consequences a majority of
the legislators had in mind when each legislator might have had several motivations and no majority had the same set of motivations?" (footnote omitted)).
52. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423, 436 (1988) ("Public choice theory suggests that the legislation
represents the outcome most preferred by the median legislator." (footnote
omitted)).
53. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia wondered:
If a state senate approves a bill by a vote of 26 to 25, and only one of
the 26 intended solely to advance religion, is the law unconstitutional?
What if 13 of the 26 had that intent? What if 3 of the 26 had the impermissible intent, but 3 of the 25 voting against the bill were motivated by
religious hostility or were simply attempting to "balance" the votes of
the impermissibly motivated colleagues?
Id. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253
(1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("It is unrealistic . . . to invalidate otherwise
legitimate action simply because an improper motive affected the deliberation of
a participant in the decisional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be
invalidated because an atheist voted for it.").
54. MacCallum, supra note 42, at 764 (quoting John Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell, 16 CAN. B. REV. 1, 3 (1938)). Professor MacCallum attacked
this premise:
Is it possible for two or more men to "have a single intention"? Anyone wishing to deny the possibility must tell us why we cannot truthfully say in the simple case of two men rolling a log toward the river
bank with the purpose of floating it down the river that there is at least
one intention that both these men have- viz., to get the log to the river
so that they can float it down the river.
Id.
55. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 6, at 870 (commenting in 1930 that "[t]he
chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given determinable, are infinitesimally small").
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rists have renewed and expanded the critique. 56 According to the
public choice model of legislative behavior, majority voting itself
is incoherent, chaotic and unpredictable. 5 7 This conclusion follows from Arrow's Paradox, under which majority voting leads to
cycling majorities "that cannot choose among three or more mutually exclusive alternatives." 5 8 Where such cycling is present,
maneuvers such as strategic voting,5 9 logrolling6 ° and agenda manipulation 6' control the results of legislative deliberation. The
will of the majority either does not exist or, at least, does not control legislative outcomes. If, as public choice theory suggests, we
cannot even attribute the statute itself to a legislative majority,
then the attempt to ascribe an underlying purpose to a collective
legislative body is senseless.
The first response to the claim that legislative purpose is incoherent is based on both confession and avoidance. Admittedly,
if legislative purpose is the aggregation of some undetermined
number of individual legislator motivations, then the concept
does not make sense. This Article began with quite a different
definition of legislative purpose, however-the end at which a law
56. The public choice theory of legislative behavior applies the economic
principles of the marketplace to the political process. It is particularly concerned with the domination of the legislative process by interest groups. See
generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, TheJurisprudenceof Public Choice, 65
TEX. L. REV. 873, 925 (1987) [hereinafter Farber & Frickey,Jurisprudencel;Farber
& Frickey, supra note 52; Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223,
267 (1986). For a further discussion of public choice theory, see infra notes 26687 and accompanying text.
57. Farber & Frickey, supra note 52, at 425-26.
58. Id. at 426. Farber and Frickey give this example of cycling majorities:
Three children-Alice, Bobby, and Cindy-have been pestering their
parents for a pet. The parents agree that the children may vote to have
a dog, a parrot, or a cat. Suppose the children's orders of preferences
are as follows: Alice-dog, parrot, cat; Bobby-parrot, cat, dog;
Cindy-cat, dog, parrot. In this situation, majority voting cannot pick a
pet. A majority (Alice and Cindy) will vote for a dog rather than a parrot; a majority (Alice and Bobby) will vote for a parrot rather than a cat;
and a majority (Bobby and Cindy) will vote for a cat rather than a dog.
Id. n.9.
59. Strategic voting involves voting against one's sincere interests in order
to promote a final outcome more consistent with one's own ultimate interests.
Farber and Frickey suggest that in the "pet picking" example, Alice (who likes
dogs better than parrots) will vote for a parrot over a dog in order to prevent the
ultimate selection of a cat. Id. at 427 n.13.
60. "Logrolling is the trading of votes on one issue for desired votes on
other issues." Id. n.12.
61. Agenda manipulation involves the order in which choices are presented
to the decisionmaker. In the pet picking example, if a dog-parrot choice is first
offered, the dog will win. If the dog-cat choice is first offered, the cat will win. If
a cat-parrot choice is first offered, the parrot will win. See id. at 426-27.
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is directed. 62 This definition of purpose does not presume. an underlying individual intelligence, nor a collection of underlying individual intelligences. If purpose does not presuppose mind,
then there is no further need to look to the minds of individual
legislators to form motives. The appropriate question is, "At
what end is the statute directed?" not, "Why did Senator Smith
vote for the bill?" The reasons why an individual legislator voted
for a bill are relevant, if at all, only as evidence to be weighed in
determining legislative purpose. Judge Posner, generally a supporter of the public choice theorists, has said that "[i]nstitutions
act purposively, therefore they have purposes. A document can
manifest a single purpose even though those who drafted it and
63
approved it had a variety of private motives and expectations."
Of course, the claim that laws have an objective end to be
achieved implicitly assumes the possibility of collective action by
the legislature. Before leaving this subject, therefore, it is appropriate to turn to the problem of cycling and its purported demolition of the coherence of legislative purpose. There is a body of
evidence that the theory of the incoherence of legislative behavior
lacks empirical support. Professors Farber and Frickey have
found that legislative outcomes are, in fact, somewhat predictable
in a wide range of situations: where preferences are unipeaked, 64 where agenda rules produce a structure-induced equilibrium 65 and where behavioral norms of fairness are at work. 66
Even without these features, results in some controlled voting experiments have been fairly predictable. 6 7 Farber and Frickey, after reviewing the theoretical and empirical work on the subject,
have concluded that "actual legislatures do not suffer from the
instability and incoherence some public choice theorists have pre62. For a discussion of the nature of legislative purpose, see supra notes 310 and accompanying text.
63. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 196 (1986).
64. Farber & Frickey, supra note 52, at 430. Preferences are uni-peaked
where, for example, they fall largely on a one-dimensional liberal/conservative
spectrum. There is evidence that members of the United States Congress have
this kind of preference. Id. at 430 n.25.
65. While agenda manipulation can lead to unpredictable outcomes, clearly
stated and widely used agenda rules tend to make outcomes more predictable.
Id. at 431.
66. The perceived equitable solution to a problem that would otherwise
result in endless cycling produces its own sort of equilibrium. Id. at 433-34.
67. Id. at 432. In controlled experimental voting, the outcomes "are fairly
predictable and clustered even where the voters' preferences lead to massive
cycles." Id. Balanced compromise outcomes are favored. Id.
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dicted. ' 68 The search for legislative intent need not be abandoned as an incoherent attempt to make one out of many.
3.

From the Particularto the General

Consider a law that requires all car owners to have the emissions system of their cars inspected annually. If we were to look
for the purpose of such a law, the following might be suggested:
1. To have emissions systems inspected.
2. To reduce automotive pollutants.
3. To improve air quality.
4. To preserve the environment.
5. To protect the public health.
6. To promote the general welfare.
These suggested purposes are ordered from the most particular
to the most general. At some level, each is a plausible candidate
for selection as the legislative purpose. The concept of legislative
purpose is not a useful tool, however, if it is that elastic. It must
be narrowed if it is to be a realistic constraint on legislative action.
As a starting point, then, we can immediately eliminate the first
and the last of the suggested purposes.
Nonetheless, there is a certain superficial attractiveness in the
first statement of purpose because emissions inspection is precisely what the statute requires. We cannot derive the purpose of a
law, however, from its operative efect. 69 It is hard to imagine that
the legislature in question placed any independent value on the
inspection in itself. Rather, the legislature required inspections as
a means to an end-the end being at least one of the higher numbered purposes listed above. If the purpose of every law is to
accomplish exactly what it accomplishes, there will always be a
perfect correlation between law and purpose. As Justice Brennan
aptly noted, "presuming purpose from result ...reduces analysis
70
to tautology."
There is no similar tautological problem with the last of the
68. Id. at 435. Posner, as well, criticizes the view of "meaninglessness" of
legislative outcomes. See Posner, supra note 63, at 199.
69. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 186-87 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan opined: "[T]he 'plain language' of
the statute can tell us only what the classification is; it can tell us nothing about
the purpose of the classification, let alone the relationship between the classification and that purpose." Id. (Brennan,J., dissenting). He added: "It may always
be said that Congress intended to do what it in fact did. If that were the extent of
our analysis, we would find every statute, no matter how arbitrary or irrational,
perfectly tailored to achieve its purpose." Id. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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suggested purposes-the promotion of the general welfare.
There is obviously a substantial distance between the law and this
purported purpose. Here, on the other hand, the distance between the law and purpose is too attenuated. One could, with
equal plausibility, conclude that there is no connection between
the law and this purpose or that there is always a connection between them. Professor Ely has argued that courts cannot label
attempts to promote the general welfare as rational or irrational. 7' Such an attempt would inevitably necessitate a value
preference, an area Ely believes the courts should avoid. 72 What
is really at issue when the general welfare is cited is the means
that have been chosen to promote that welfare. Why is one industry or one activity supported rather than others to promote
the general welfare? These questions are better answered more
directly, without regard to the umbrella goal of promoting the
general welfare.
Having eliminated the most particular and most general of
the suggested purposes, we now need to consider the remaining,
purposes, which are of intermediate generality. As we move from
the general to the specific, it becomes clear that the fourth and
fifth suggested purposes-protecting the public health and preserving the environment-are still too attenuated. If a law was
designed to achieve either of these purposes, yet only required
automobile emissions inspections, it would be grossly underinclusive. If the concern for the public health was genuine, why did
the legislature fail to address other substantial public health
problems, like smoking or AIDS? If the legislature's concern was
for the environment, why did the statute not address issues of
land and water pollution? It seems reasonable to conclude that
the legislature's purpose was something less comprehensive. 7 3
The two remaining purposes suggested-improving air quality and reducing automotive pollutants-are more specific. They
are also closely related to each other, in that reducing automotive
71. Ely, supra note 17, at 1241 (opining that if Court identifies "promotion
of the 'general welfare' " as legislative goal, "standard evaluative technique of
the Fourteenth Amendment-the testing of choice/goal relations in 'rationalityirrationality' terms-is inapposite, and an alternative to the disadvantageous distinction model of review must be found if such choices are to be policed" (footnote omitted)).
72. Id. at 1241, 1248.
73. Cf Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, supra note 1,
at 143 ("Surely 'public safety' is too large a goal and competing public purposes
are too many for any statute to have as its single purpose the promotion of
safety.").
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pollutants is a means toward the end of improving air quality. Is it
possible to choose between the two and confidently conclude that
we have identified the definitive statutory purpose? The legislative history and other evidence of legislative purpose may be
helpful in this regard.7 4 What was the problem that the legislature was seeking to remedy when it considered the law at issue?
Is the requirement that cars be inspected part of a law regulating
the manufacture and use of automobiles? Or is it part of a statute
dealing generally with issues of air quality? The concerns that
prompted the law's passage in the first instance comprise some
evidence of the appropriate level of generality at which its pur75
pose can be identified.
In some cases, however, there will be no obvious legislative
purpose that abounds from this analysis. Even in these cases,
however, a court should be able to identify a small set of consistent purposes within a narrow range of generality. There is, of
course, room for manipulation in this area. If a court chooses to
define legislative purpose broadly, the statute will likely be underinclusive. If, for example, the purpose of the emissions law is to
improve air quality, then why did the legislature not also regulate
emissions from factory smokestacks? If the purpose is defined
too narrowly, analysis is reduced to tautology in that the purpose
of the law is to accomplish exactly what it accomplishes. But even
if the concept of legislative purpose is sometimes manipulable in
terms of the appropriate level of generality, there are ordinarily
sufficient indicators and evidence that the concept itself is not
incoherent.
4.

Multiple Different Purposes

The legislature may seek to accomplish two or more ends in a
single piece of legislation. 76 The Food Stamp Act provides a
good example. 77 In that statute, Congress sought both to raise
74. For a discussion of identifying legislative purpose, see infra notes 10384 and accompanying text.
75. Cf Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (K.B. 1584) ("[T]he office of
all the Judges is always to make such [] construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief ... and to add force and life to the cure and
remedy, according to the fine intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico.").
76. The concern in this section is with multiple legislative ends; it is not
concerned with the earlier-discussed problem of multiple and conflicting motivations of individual legislators. For a discussion of the issue of individual legislators' motivations, see supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
77. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 is codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2030
(1988). The Act was passed "in order to promote the general welfare, [and] to
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levels of nutrition among low-income households and to
strengthen the agricultural economy by distributing farm surplus. 78 These two purposes have a harmonious factual relationthe government's purchase of food for low-income households
strengthens the agricultural economy. There is no necessary connection, however, between the two purposes. It is easy to conceive of ways to advance one of the purposes without advancing
the other. 79 It is even possible that a law will have two purposes
that pull in opposite directions. The classic example of this strain
occurs in statutes enacting welfare programs. The principal purpose of such laws is to provide financial assistance to specific
groups of individuals considered to be needy and deserving; the
80
secondary purpose is to preserve the state's fiscal integrity.
Spending more advances the first purpose; spending less advances the second.
The courts recognize that statutes are often designed to
achieve several purposes. "[L]egislators . . .are properly con81
cerned with balancing numerous competing considerations."
Generally, a court need not determine which purpose is primary
and which is secondary. 82 The court will ask only whether a challenged classification is "so unrelated to the achievement of any
combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that
safeguard the well-being of the Nation's population by raising levels of nutrition
among low-income households." Id. § 2011 (congressional declaration of
policy).
78. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-34
(1973) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2011).
79. For example, Congress could advance the first purpose but not the second by purchasing surplus food products abroad. Congress could advance the
second purpose but not the first by arranging for grain sales to the Soviet Union.
80. Compare, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) ("We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its
programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures .... But a State

may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of
its citizens.") with Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972) ("Since budgetary constraints do not allow the payment of the full standard of need for all
welfare recipients, the State may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the
least able of the categorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of living.").
81. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Rarely can it be said that a legislature ... made a decision motivated by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the
'dominant' or 'primary' one.").
82. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973) ("[O]ur decisions do not
authorize courts to pick and choose among legitimate legislative aims to determine which is primary and which subordinate .... So long as the state purpose
upholding a statutory class is legitimate and nonillusory, its lack of primacy is
not disqualifying.").
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the legislature's actions were irrational." 8 3
The presence of more than one end at which a law is directed
complicates analysis and renders it occasionally manipulable.
Ironically, the existence of a second legislative purpose cuts both
ways-it can be used to invalidate a law that is otherwise perfectly
reasonable, and it can be used to save a law that might otherwise
appear irrational. The different results depend on the court's focus. A classification may appear to be arbitrary as to one purpose,
but be clearly related to another purpose. If the court focuses on
the first purpose and ignores the second, the statute is more likely
to be invalidated. For example, a statutory provision that excludes households of unrelated individuals from the Food Stamp
program may appear to be arbitrary because the relationships of
household members have nothing to do with the statute's stated
purposes of stimulating the agricultural economy and improving
personal nutrition. 84 If a court considers what was arguably the
actual, unstated purpose of this particular amendment to the
Food Stamp Act, however-the prevention of fraud-the exclusion appears far more relevant.8 5 A court that chooses to focus
only on the statute's stated purposes is likely to find the classification irrational.
The existence of a second purpose has been used, on the
other hand, to explain and justify why a particular group was singled out in what seems to be an invidiously discriminatory manner. For example, when allocating a fixed pool of welfare money
among numerous individuals with acknowledged need, why did
the Texas legislature provide for 100% of need for the aged, 95%
of need for the blind and disabled, but only 75% of need for Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients?8 6
Although it is appropriate to give effect to the state budgetary
constraints, why were the AFDC recipients made to bear the
brunt of the pain? The United States Supreme Court upheld the
Texas welfare scheme on the grounds that "the State may have
83. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the historical background of a legislative decision, see infra notes 185-

90 and accompanying text.
84. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
85. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that household of related
persons "provides a guarantee which is not provided by households containing
unrelated individuals that the household exists for some purpose other than to
collect federal food stamps").
86. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972) (state computed

need of each group, aged, blind and disabled and AFDC, then paid out different
levels of "recognized need" to each).
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concluded that the aged and infirm are the least able of the categorical grant recipients to bear the hardships of an inadequate
standard of living." 8 7 The existence of this secondary concern
helped the Court explain and justify what otherwise appeared to
88
be a statutory discrimination.
The multiplicity of legislative purposes and a court's ability
to focus on one or another contribute to the unpredictability of
court decisions. Ideally, courts should realize that "it is only in
the context of the full statutory scheme that full meaning can be
given to each legislative objective."8' 9
D.

The Relevance of Legislative Purpose

Even if legislative purpose is discoverable, there is a longstanding claim that such purpose is irrelevant. 90 The Supreme
Court adopted this view in both United States v. O'Brien9 ' and
Palmer v. Thompson, 9 2 asserting respectively that "[i]nquiries into
congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter"9 3 and
that a legislative act does not "violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it."' 94 These
statements would be entitled to some weight if the Court itself
paid any attention to them. The Court, however, has rejected the
views expressed in O'Brien and Palmer, both expressly and in
practice.
When the Court in Washington v. Davis9 5 held that only purposeful racial discrimination violated the Equal Protection
Clause, it expressly explained in a footnote that Palmer was inconsistent with both prior and subsequent cases. 96 In practice, the
87. Id. at 549.
88. See also Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 109 (1979) (accepting imperfection in achievement of government's primary objective-maintaining competence of Foreign Service-because imperfection was rationally related to
secondary objective-legislative convenience).
89. Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, supra note 1, at
127.
90. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 6, at 872 ("A legislative intent, undiscoverable in fact, irrelevant if it were discovered, is the last residuum of our 'golden
rule.' It is a queerly amorphous piece of slag. Are we really reduced to such
shifts that we must fashion masters and endow them with imaginations in order
to understand statutes?").

91. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
92. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
93. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 383.

94. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224.
95. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
96. Id. at 244 n. 11. The footnote reads:
To the extent that Palmer suggests a generally applicable proposition
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Court has rejected O'Brien and Palmer by insisting that purpose is
precisely what matters under the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, 9 7 the Commerce Clause9 8 and Article IV's
Privileges and Immunities Clause, 99 in addition to the Equal Protection Clause, as stated in Davis. Although the difficulties with
the idea of legislative purpose are substantial, it is clear that it is
relevant to constitutional adjudication.
We can try to explain away the reach of O'Brien and Palmer.
The two cases can be seen as setting forth the noncontroversial
claim that the motives of individual legislators are, in themselves,
not relevant to equal protection analysis.' 0 0 This limitation
would not prevent a court from reviewing the purpose of the legislature-the end at which the law aims-and considering individual motives as some weak evidence of this purpose. One problem
with this view of the cases is that, although it is consistent with the
Court's subsequent holdings, it suggests that O'Brien and Palmer
themselves reached the wrong result. In O'Brien, for example, the
Court had evidence before it that the objective end at which the
law aimed was the impermissible purpose of suppressing free
speech.' 0 1 Similarly, the historic background and sequence of
that legislative purpose is irrelevant in constitutional adjudication, our
prior cases-as indicated in the text-are to the contrary; and very
shortly after Palmer, all members of the Court majority in that case
joined the Court's opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman, which dealt with the
issue of public financing for private schools and which announced, as
the Court had several times before, that the validity of public aid to
church-related schools includes close inquiry into the purpose of the
challenged statute.
Id. (citation omitted).
97. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("[T]he statute
must have a secular legislative purpose .... ").
98. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 66971 (1981) (discussing whether purpose of state was promotion of safety (permissible) or discouragement of interstate truck traffic (impermissible)).
99. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (Privileges and
Immunities Clause bars "discrimination against citizens of other States where
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that
they are citizens of other States").
100. For a discussion of the motives of individual legislators, see supra
notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
101. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 387 (1968). The Court,
per ChiefJustice Warren, stated:
The committee has taken notice of the defiant destruction and mutilation of draft cards by dissident persons who disapprove of national
policy. If allowed to continue unchecked this contumacious conduct
represents a potential threat to the exercise of the power to raise and
support armies ....
The House Committee ... is fully aware of, and
shares in, the deep concern expressed throughout the Nation over the
increasing incidences in which individuals and large groups of individu-
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events leading to the pool closings in Palmer might readily have
been viewed as clear evidence of an objectively impermissible
02
end-purposeful discrimination against blacks.'
Notwithstanding the broad but overstated language of
O'Brien and Palmer, the Supreme Court does not consider the concept of legislative purpose to be irrelevant. The Court continues
to determine the constitutional validity of statutes by reference to
their purpose.
E.

Summay

The notion of legislative purpose-the end at which a law
aims-is a coherent, relevant and significant component of constitutional analysis. Notwithstanding the criticisms of the notion,
the concept of legislative purpose does a significant amount of
constitutional work. Even if it is conceded, however, that legislative purpose is a significant idea in the abstract, courts need some
practical guidance concerning the means by which to identify particular legislative purposes. The next part of this Article examines the difficulties in identifying legislative purpose.
III.
A.

IDENTIFYING LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

Actual Purpose or Hypothetical Purpose

Rationality review requires that a classification be rationally
related to a permissible legislative purpose. Whenever a court
chooses to hypothesize what purposes the legislature might have
considered, the statute will be upheld.' 0 3 When a court chooses
to determine the actual purpose of a law, on the other hand, the
statute is frequently invalidated.' 0 4 As a result, "actual purpose"
review often turns out to be deferential in theory, but fatal in
0 5
fact. '
Traditional, deferential rationality review provides for an extensive amount of hypothesizing. "The court may . . .hypotheals openly defy and encourage others to defy the authority of the Government by destroying or mutilating their draft cards.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 589, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1965); H.R. REP. No.
747, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1965)).
102. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218-19 (1971).
103. Cf Gerald Gunther, Forward: In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)
(referring to "deferential 'old' equal protection . ..with minimal scrutiny in
theory and virtually none in fact" (footnote omitted)).
104. Id. (referring to "aggressive 'new' equal protection with scrutiny that
was 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact").
105. See id.
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size the motivations of the . . . legislature to find a legitimate
objective promoted by the provision under attack."10 6 Actual evidence of legislative purpose is irrelevant. 10 7 Rather, identification of purpose is a purely intellectual exercise, limited only by
the imagination of the court and the imaginations of the government attorneys on whom the court sometimes relies to fashion a
purpose.10 8
The traditional statement of this view is that a court will uphold a classification "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."109 So long as plausible reasons for legislative
action have been hypothesized, the court's "inquiry is at an
end." 1 10 The court need not inquire into and the legislature
"need not articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.""'
To the extent the standard just articulated is the one actually
applied, then rationality review does not really constitute any review at all. 1 2 If legislative purposes can be arbitrarily hypothesized, then no law can fail the test. For even the most egregiously
discriminatory laws, a legislative purpose promoting the public
13
good can be hypothesized and the review is at end.'
Not all the members of the United States Supreme Court
agree, however, with the standard just articulated. In Schweiker v.
106. Maimed v. Thornburgh, 621 F.2d 565, 569 (3d Cir.) (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 603, 612 (1960) and Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 487-90 (1955)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 955 (1980).
107. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960) (stating that it
is not constitutionally relevant whether purported legislative purpose was in fact
"reasoning [which] underlay the legislative decision").
108. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court analyzes the rationality of § 231
b(h) in terms of a justification suggested by government attorneys, but never
adopted by Congress."); see also Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244 (1981)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("When a legislative purpose can be suggested only by
the ingenuity of a government lawyer litigating the constitutionality of a statute,
a reviewing court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy choice
as its absence.").
109. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (state statute
which allowed only certain merchants to be open on Sundays not violative of
equal protection where "legislature could reasonably find that the Sunday sale
of exempted commodities was necessary either for the health of the populace or
for the enhancement of the recreational atmosphere of the day").
110. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179 (equal protection inquiry ends where "there are
plausible reasons for Congress' action").
111. Id.
112. If a court is free to assume facts necessary to justify legislation, it has
broad authority to conceive that the very same state of facts exists. See, e.g.,
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 426 ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").
113. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 179.
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Wilson," 4 for example, four dissenting Justices rejected the view
that the actual purpose of a law is irrelevant. The dissenters conceded that a clear legislative statement of purpose in the statute
or legislative history was entitled to substantial deference but that
nonetheless, "[a]scertainment of actual purpose to the extent feasible remains an essential step in equal protection." ' " 5
Justice Stevens has attempted to stake out a middle ground
between the extreme deference of hypothesizing purposes and
the more assertive demand for actual purpose. In his view, there
must be a correlation between the classification and "either the
actual purpose of the statute or a legitimate purpose that we may
reasonably presume to have motivated an impartial legislature.""11 6 Justice Stevens would limit traditional deference by
adopting what may be labeled a "reasonably presumable purpose" test." t7 He would not credit farfetched claims of what the
legislature might have considered. 1 8
On several occasions, the Supreme Court decided cases by
looking to the actual purpose of a challenged statute and finding
the ascertained purpose to be impermissible.'" 9 In City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. ,120 the Court rejected a number of
asserted purposes, all of which were at least "conceivable," and
refused to hypothesize on its own what might have influenced the
government defendant. Instead, the Court found that the actual
purpose of a zoning permit denial was to give effect to an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, an impermissible
purpose. 12 1 Similarly, in United States Department of Agriculture v.
114. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
115. Id. at 244 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
116. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 181 (Stevens, J., concurring) (criticizing use of
merely "plausible" purposes, but equally critical of undue emphasis on actual
purposes).
117. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
118. Id. (StevensJ., concurring).
119. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (promoting domestic business by discriminating against nonresidents is not legitimate
purpose); see also Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612 (1985)
(finding statute that singled out previous residents for tax exemption did not
further legitimate state purpose); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985) (giving tax exemption to residents, but not to nonresidents, did not further legitimate purpose); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (apportioning benefits on
basis of length of residence did not further legitimate state purpose).
120. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
121. Id. at 450 (state action in denying special use permit to home for mentally handicapped, while not imposing same restriction on similar uses such as
apartment houses and hospitals, is evidence of impermissible legislative
objective).
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Moreno, 12 2 the Court refused to credit the asserted purpose of

preventing fraud and made no attempt to hypothesize a legitimate purpose. It instead found that the actual purpose of the
challenged amendment was the impermissible goal of preventing
"hippie communes" from participating in the food stamp program.' 23 The Court has, therefore, on occasion rejected the
traditional, deferential version of rationality review and instead
searched for the actual purpose of governmental action.
B.

ProvingActual Purpose

If equal protection only demands a rational relationship between a classification and a hypothesized purpose, then specific
evidence of actual legislative purpose is irrelevant. 2 4 When,
however, a court interprets the rationality standard to require
proof of actual purpose, then that court must determine what evidence is probative to its determination and how much weight
should be given to any particular type of evidence. The Supreme
Court has found several different kinds of evidence to be relevant
to the proof of actual purpose.
1. Statutory Statements of Purpose
The legislature may announce the purpose of a law in the
officially adopted statutory language.' 2 5 For example, when the
Minnesota legislature banned the retail sale of milk in plastic containers, the statute itself stated that its purposes included reducing solid waste, conserving energy and promoting resource
conservation.' 2 6 When the Alaska legislature adopted a plan to
distribute a percentage of oil revenues to residents, the statute
announced that its purposes were to provide an equitable distri122. 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (denying federal assistance to unrelated individuals living in single household while allowing assistance to related individuals in
single household is violative of due process).
123. Id. at 534-35.
124. See Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 936 (5th Cir. 1988)
("[T]he task of hypothesizing necessarily renders less important the actual reasons which the state may have had for making the challenged classification....
[T]ruth is not the issue.").
125. See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 545 (1982) ("The
purposes of the Proposition are stated in its text and are legitimate, nondiscriminatory objectives."); see a/soJohnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 376 (1974) ("Unlike many state and federal statutes that come before us, Congress in this statute
has responsibly revealed its express legislative objectives in § 1651 of the Act
and no other objective is claimed.").
126. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 458-59
(1981) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 116F.21 (1978) (repealed 1981)).
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bution of the state's energy wealth, to encourage persons to establish and maintain residence in Alaska and to encourage
127
prudent management of the permanent fund.
In rational basis cases, the Supreme Court is deferential to
such explicit statutory statements of purpose. "[T]his Court will
assume that the objectives articulated by the legislature are the
actual purposes of the statute unless an examination of the circumstances forces us to conclude that they 'could not have been a
goal of the legislation.' "128
Under rational basis review, this deference to the legislative
articulation of purpose is sufficiently strong to withstand even factual evidence to the contrary.' 29 In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,130 for example, the Court relied on the purposes
articulated in the statute, notwithstanding the fact that the trial
court had found the actual purpose of the law to be quite different
3
than the articulated purpose.1 '
Statutory statements of purpose are strong evidence of legislative purpose. They cannot, however, be given conclusive
weight.' 32 A judicial attitude of extreme deference to statutory
statements of purpose would have the effect of encouraging legislatures to dissemble about the purpose of a law.' 3 3 A legislature
so inclined can clothe even the most pernicious statute in the garment of broad-minded public purpose. A statute designed to
127. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 n.7 (1982).
128. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 463 n.7 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975)).
129. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) ("In an equal protection case . . .those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the
court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based
could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental
decisionmaker.").
130. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
131. Id. at 460. The statute identified environmental concerns as the purpose of the law; the trial court, however, found that the actual purpose was to
promote the economic interests of certain segments of an industry at the expense of others. Id. at 460-61.
132. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) ("But the
mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.").
133. See Linde, supra note 1, at 231. Linde stated:
Pursued into the legislative process, the hope for candor is more likely
to produce hypocrisy. Recitals of findings and purposes are the task of
anonymous draftsmen, committee staffs, and counsel for interested
parties, not legislators. Such recitals will be an attempt to provide
whatever, under prevailing case law, is expected to satisfy a court.
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promote racism can be camouflaged as enacted to protect the
peace.' 3 4 A statute adopted to advance the interests of optometrists over opticians can be portrayed as enacted to protect
35
consumers.'
The Supreme Court has been less deferential towards the articulated purposes of legislation that potentially violates the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. In such cases, the Court has
rejected statutory statements of purpose and invalidated statutes
on the ground that they were not in fact adopted to promote their
stated purposes. Specifically, the Court found in Edwards v. Aguillard 136 that a statute designed by its terms to promote academic
freedom was in fact an unconstitutional attempt to promote religion.

37

Similarly, in Stone v. Graham 13

8

the Court found that the

purpose of a law requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments was the promotion of religion.' 3 9 It rejected the law's
stated purpose, which was to provide for instruction in a funda140
mental legal code.
Although statutory statements of purpose can be misleading,
they remain the best evidence of legislative purpose. In rational
basis cases, courts ordinarily accord such statements the greatest
deference. Where statutory statements of purpose are lacking,
courts look to alternative sources of evidence. The next section
examines the value of legislative history as an alternative source
of evidence.
134. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that city
ordinance prohibiting blacks from purchasing homes in white neighborhoods
violates equal protection in spite of stated purpose to diminish miscegenation
and promote public peace).
135. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (finding
legislature might have concluded that statute would protect health and welfare
of general public by assuring proper examination for, and fitting of, eyeglasses)
with Richard A. Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionalityof PreferentialTreatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 29 (arguing that it was "almost
certainly the case ... [that] the true purpose of the statute in Lee Optical was to
protect the optometrists from competition").
136. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
137. Id. at 589.
138. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
139. Id. at 42 ("If the posted copies of the Ten Commandments are to have
any effect at all, it will be to induce the schoolchildren to read, meditate upon,
perhaps to venerate and obey, the Commandments.").
140. Id. at 41 ("The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text in
the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." (footnote omitted)).
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Legislative History

The United States Supreme Court has considered three types
of evidence, grouped together under the classification of legislative history, in an effort to ascertain legislature purpose: (1) the
official committee reports; (2) the debate on the legislative floor;
and (3) subsequent statements of individual legislators.
a.

Committee Reports

After the statute itself, the committee report is the next best
source of information on statutory purpose. The reports are considered "authoritative."' 4 ' Additionally, courts frequently rely
on such reports.14 2 Because legislators do not vote on committee
reports, it seems that the reports should be accorded less weight
than statutory statements of purpose. On the other hand, as "the
considered and collective understanding of those [legislators] involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation,"'' 4 3 they
cannot reasonably be ignored.
Currently, Justice Scalia is the leading proponent of a contrary view. He believes that committee reports are entitled to little weight.' 44 Justice Scalia bases his claim on the grounds that
the reports are written by committee staff, not by legislators, and
that legislators rarely are familiar with the contents of such reports.' 45 Furthermore, Justice Scalia states that committee re141. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) (terming reports of Senate and House Armed Services Committees more "authoritative"
than statements made by three Congressmen during limited floor debate on
bill).
142. See, e.g., Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 371 (1988)
(citing Senate Committee Report as evidence that purpose of statute was avoiding undue favoritism to one side or other in private labor disputes); see also
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 235 (1981) (citing committee reports as
"clear expression of Congress' understanding"); United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 185 n.3 (1980) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (citing Senate
and House Reports to demonstrate that purpose of law was to preserve vested
rights).
143. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (quoting Zuber v. Allen, 369 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)). "In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies
in the Committee Reports on the bill, which 'represen[t] the considered and
collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation.' " Id.
144. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing Court's reference to document issued by "single committee of a
single house as the action of Congress [because it] displays the level of unreality
that our unrestrained use of legislative history has attained" (emphasis added)).
145. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in
question ....").
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ports are written to influence the courts rather than to inform the
legislators." 4 6 Others claim that the reports are sometimes the
result of capture by special interests, used to accomplish covertly
what the proponents of a point of view could not accomplish on
47
the legislative floor.1

Two recent law review articles have questioned Justice
Scalia's arguments and found his textualist, "four corners" rule of
statutory interpretation wanting. 148 As stated in one article, "Justice Scalia and his followers indulge in some doubtful factual assumptions."'14 9 The second article opined that Justice Scalia's
implicit vision of legislators drafting and poring over the text of a
bill, while ignoring the committee reports, "may accord little with
the reality of the legislative process."' 50 Typically, legislators
draft the text of legislation no more than they draft the committee
report. Furthermore, as most law students will attest, frequently
the quickest way to grasp what a proposed law will accomplish is
to read the committee report, not to crawl through the thicket of
technical statutory language.' 5' It would thus be surprising if legislators did not read the committee reports at least as often as
they read the text of the statute.
Justice Scalia is correct in asserting that the use of legislative
history has been abused on occasion.' 52 If his other assertions
were modified, they would be more meritorious. The courts,
however, continue to rely extensively on committee reports as
53
substantial evidence of legislative purpose.1
b.

Debate on the Legislative Floor

A second form of legislative history is the record of floor debate. This is composed of the statements of individual legislators,
often including their vocalized understanding of the purpose of a
146. Id. at 98-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
147. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 52, at 444.
148. Farber & Frickey, supra note 52; see also Zeppos, supra note 49.

149. Farber & Frickey, supra note 52, at 445.
150. Zeppos, supra note 49, at 1311.

151. Cf Farber & Frickey, supra note 52, at 445 ("[Alccording to a principal
study of congressional policymaking procedures, legislators outside the committee and their staffs focus primarily on the report, not the bill itself.").
152. See, e.g., Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Kozinski, J., concurring). In Wallace, the majority cited legislative history at
length. See id. at 1543-52. Judge Kozinski objected: "The fact of the matter is
that legislative history can be cited to support almost any proposition, and frequently is." Id. at 1559 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
153. See, e.g., id. at 1545-46.
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bill under consideration. 54
In comparison to the two types of evidence of legislative purpose already considered-statutory statements of purpose and
committee reports-statements by individual legislators are the
least reliable. Statements from the floor represent the motivations of individual legislators.' 55 As a result, the statements vary
greatly and are often contradictory. 56 Additionally, only a small
percentage of legislators casting votes typically explain for the
record the reasons for their vote. 15 7 It is thus arbitrary to give
weight only to those views that were saved in the legislative record.' 5 8 For these reasons, the Court often "eschew[s] reliance on
the passing comments of one Member ... and casual statements
59
from floor debates."'
As a general matter, however, the Court has occasionally
considered the contemporary statements of individual legislators
as relevant to the issue of legislative purpose.' 60 This is most
154. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) ("The legislative or administrative history may
be highly relevant, especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body ....").
155. See South Carolina Educ. Ass'n v. Campbell, 883 F.2d 1251, 1262 (4th
Cir. 1989) ("It is axiomatic that if motivation is pertinent, it is the motivation of
the entire legislature, not the motivation of a handful of valuable members, that
is relevant." (citing Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 24 (1845)).
156. For a discussion of the diversity in motivations of individual legislators, see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., South CarolinaEduc. Ass'n, 883 F.2d at 1262 (noting that legislative record is often silent as to whether views of legislators actually reflect sentiments of legislature as whole; stating that "legislative history is manifestly sparse
and contradictory").
158. Id. at 1261 ("It is manifestly impossible to determine with certainty the
motivation of a legislative body by resorting to the utterances of individual
members thereof ...since there is no way of knowing why those, who did not
speak, may have supported or opposed the legislation." (footnote omitted)). But
see North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 527 (1982) (absent committee reports, statements by Senator made on day amendment was passed are
"only authoritative indications of congressional intent").
159. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (citing Weinberger v.
Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982), Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385
(1968)); see also Aldrige v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 23 (1845) ("[T]he judgment of
the court cannot ...be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual members of Congress in the debate which took place on its passage, nor by
the motives or reasons assigned by them for supporting or opposing amendments that were offered.").
160. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (contemporary statements make legislative history
"highly relevant"); see also North Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 526-27 ("Senator
Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are
an authoritative guide to the statute's construction."). But see In re Carlson, 292
F. Supp. 778, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1968) ("In the course of oral argument on the
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likely to be the case when an amendment is first considered on
the legislative floor, without committee reports. 16 1 For example,
when reviewing an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that denied food stamps to households of unrelated individuals, the
Court determined that its purpose was to harm hippie communes. 162 The evidence adduced to support this claim was a
statement by Senator Holland recorded in the Congressional
Record.' 6 3 In a similar vein, when reviewing an Alabama state
constitutional provision that disenfranchised persons convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude, the Court cited the opening address by the president of the constitutional convention as evidence that the purpose of the provision was to establish white
64

supremacy. 1

The statements of individual legislators, made in the course
of legislative debate, are thus occasionally relevant to the issue of
legislative purpose. Because these statements are selective and
sometimes contradictory, however, their relevance is quite limited. The next section of this Article examines the even more limited relevance of statements made by individual legislators after
the enactment of a law.
c.

Subsequent Statements of Individual Legislators

Although it may sometimes be appropriate to consider statements made during the legislative debate, subsequent statements
of individual legislators are far less relevant. "Inquiry into the
Senate Floor, the choice of words by a Senator is not always accurate or exact.
For this reason, courts have held that statements in debate are not a proper
measure of the contents of a statute."), aff'd, 423 F.2d 714 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 819 (1970); see also In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988)
("Stray comments by individual legislators, not otherwise supported by statutory
language or committee reports, cannot be attributed to the full body that voted
on the bill. The opposite inference is far more likely.").
161. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
(after finding, "regrettably," little legislative history to illuminate the purpose of
statutory amendment, Court considered statement of Senator Holland); see also
Murphy v. Empire of Am., FSA, 746 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1984) (labeling isolated remarks of representatives as entitled to "little or no weight" except when
there is no legislative history or enactment).
162. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 ("The legislative history.., indicates that that
amendment was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes'
from participating in the food stamp program.").
163. Id.
164. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (evidence that constitutional provision was designed to disenfranchise blacks came from testimony
and opinion of historians and record of statements made at convention).
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mental process of decisionmakers usually is to be avoided."' 6 5
Only "[i]n some extraordinary circumstances the members might
be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of
the official action."' 66 Such testimony will frequently be barred
by the doctrine of privilege.' 6 7 It may also represent an unwarranted invasion by the courts into the separate powers of the legislative branch of government.' 6 It will thus be exceedingly rare
that a legislator will ever be called on to testify in court to explain
why she voted one way or another.
As with the consideration of statements in floor debates,
there are exceptions to the general prohibition. For example, in
Wallace v. Jaffree 16 9 the Court considered the constitutionality of
three Alabama statutory provisions that provided for a period of
silence for meditation or voluntary prayer in public schools. At
70
issue was whether or not the statute had a secular purpose.
The Court found that the statute's purpose was to return voluntary prayer to the public schools. 17 1 As evidence of this purpose,
the Court cited two statements by the bill's sponsor, one in the
165. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941)).
166. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 268 (1977) (remarking that legislative or administrative history "may
be highly relevant.., where there are contemporary statements by members of
the decisionmaking body").
167. Id.; see also Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). "The privilege
of legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do or say in
legislative proceedings has tap roots in the Parliamentary struggles of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." Id. at 372. The Tenney Court continued:
"The privilege would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the
cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the
pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives." Id. at 377.
168. See, e.g., South Carolina Educ. Ass'n v. Campbell, 883 F.2d 1251 (4th
Cir. 1989). The Campbell court stated:
Such an inquiry is inimical to the independence of the legislative
branch and inconsistent with the constitutional separation of powers.
Moreover, probing inquiries by federal courts into the motivations of
legislators by calling representatives to testify concerning their motivations and those of their colleagues will doubtlessly have a chilling effect
on the legislative process.
Id. at 1262.
169. 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (states have no greater power to interfere with
freedom of religion than federal government).
170. Id. at 40. One statute authorized a one-minute period of silence in all
public schools "for meditation." Id. (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1984)).
A second statute authorized a period of silence "for meditation," and the third
statute allowed teachers to lead "willing students" in a pre-written prayer to
"Almighty God ... the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world." Id. (citing
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 to -20.2).
171. Id. at 57-58 (referring to "wholly religious" character of statutes).
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legislative record and one in the trial court at an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction. 17 2 Justice
O'Connor, in concurrence, was troubled by the denigration of
"an express secular purpose due to postenactment testimony by
particular legislators."17
Courts should be wary of post-enactment statements of legislators about legislative purpose, both because they are not particularly good evidence and because the use of such statements may
infringe on the required separation of judicial and legislative
functions. The next section examines an alternative, less direct
kind of evidence-the effects of a law.
3.

Effects

Sometimes, the best evidence of legislative purpose comes
not from the statements of the legislature, individually or collectively, about what they were trying to do, but rather from the actual impact of the law itself. Although it is improper to collapse
purpose into effect, the effects of a law are an important starting
point in identifying its purpose. 174 Effects can be identified objectively, without necessitating the psychoanalysis of the legislature
collectively or legislators individually. 1 75 Consequently, the
Supreme Court has approved the use of a statute's effect as evi76
dence of its purpose.'
Consider the Alabama statute that changed the city boundaries of Tuskegee from a square to a "strangely irregular twentyeight sided figure." 177 There was no direct evidence of legislative
purpose. 178 The alleged effect of the unusually-shaped diagram,
however, was to remove from the voting district virtually all of the
172. Id. at 43, 56-57.
173. Id. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (in determining if legislation had discriminatory purpose, evidence of discriminatory impact provides "[a]n important starting
point").
175. For example, in a discrimination case the result-reduced benefits to
the burdened party-may be evidence of an intent to discriminate against the
burdened party.
176. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266; see also Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("[D]iscriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the
totality of relevant facts, including ... that the law bears more heavily on one
race.").
177. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (district court erred
in dismissing complaint since allegations, if proven, would establish that inevitable effect of act was to deprive blacks of right to vote).
178. See id at 342.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37: p. I

city's black voters but not a single white voter. 17 9 The Supreme
Court had no trouble in determining that if the facts alleged were
proven, then the purpose of the law was to deprive black voters of
their municipal vote.' 8 0
The effects of a law, while evidence of purpose and an important starting point, are not conclusive.' 8 ' The Court has made it
clear that the foreseeability of certain consequences does not in
itself make the achievement of those consequences the purpose of
the law.' 82 To demonstrate purpose, it must be shown that a legislature acted at least in part "because of" and not merely "in
spite of" the specific effects of a law.' 8 3 Thus, even though the
Massachusetts legislature must have been aware that an absolute
hiring preference for veterans would have an adverse impact on
women, that evidence did not demonstrate that the purpose of
84
the law was to discriminate against women.'
Therefore, the effects of a statute are relevant to the issue of
legislative purpose, and, in extreme cases, can be sufficient evidence of that purpose. More commonly, however, the effects of a
law are only a statutory point of analysis, and are insufficient without supporting evidence to prove legislative purpose. The next
section examines one of those other kinds of evidence-the historical background that underlies a legislative enactment.
4.

Historical Background

The historical background of a legislative decision is another
source of evidence of legislative purpose, "particularly if it reveals
179. Id. at 341.
180. Id. Specifically, the Court stated:
If these allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified, the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical
purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely
concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro
citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.
Id.
181. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) ("Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of invidious
racial discrimination.").
182. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 277-78 (1979) (holding
that state did not discriminate against women even though statute's effects generally favored men).
183. Id. at 279.
184. Id. ("[N]othing in the record demonstrates that [a] preference for veterans [operating against women] would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotyped and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil
Service.").
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a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes."' 8 5 In
Hunter v. Underwood,'8 6 the United States Supreme Court looked
at the historical background of a statute that disenfranchised persons convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. Although
the statute was racially neutral on its face, the Court was able to
filter out its true purpose-the disenfranchisement of blacks-by
reviewing the history of the convention at which it was
adopted.' 8 7 That convention, the Court explained, was "part of a
movement that swept the post-Reconstruction South to disenfranchise blacks."' 8 8 In an analogous setting, the Court found
that the historical background of school board decisions is to be
considered as evidence of the school board's purpose.' 8 9
The evidence of historical background puts legislative actions
in context and thus can help to explain why a law was adopted.
Courts do not seem to use this evidence frequently, however, as
an aid in identifying legislative purpose. "Historical background"
may be too open-ended and vague a concept for lawyers and
judges, who will not ordinarily be professional historians as
well.' 90 The next section examines evidence of events occurring
much closer in time and more obviously related to the enactment
of a law.
5.

Specific Sequence of Events

The specific sequence of events leading up to a legislative enactment may also be relevant as proof of legislative purpose.' 9'
For example, where an area has for years been zoned to allow for
multiple-unit housing, a sudden change to single-family zoning
would be suspicious if the zoning board acts as soon as it learns of
plans to build integrated housing.' 92
185. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 267 (1977) (citing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)).
186. 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
187. Id. at 229 ("The evidence of legislative intent available to the courts
below consisted of the proceedings of the convention, several historical studies,
and the testimony of two expert historians.").

188. Id.
189. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207 (1973) ("Evidence that
similar and related offenses were committed . . .tend[s] to show a consistent
pattern of conduct highly relevant to the issue of intent." (alteration in original)
(quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949))).
190. But see Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228-29 (considering testimony and opinions
of historians on issue of purpose of Alabama statute).
191. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429

U.S. 252, 267 (1977).
192. Id.
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In another case, a plurality of the Court used the sequence of
events surrounding passage of the legislation in question to determine legislative purpose.19 3 The Iowa legislation barred the
use of trucks longer than sixty feet on Iowa's interstate highways,
but provided an exemption for border cities.' 9 4 When the law
was challenged, the state argued that its purpose was public
safety. 19 5 The Court, however, looked at the events leading to
enactment of the law. 196 The legislature had originally passed a
19 7
law that would have permitted sixty-five foot double trucks.
The governor vetoed the bill on the ground that it "would benefit
only a few Iowa-based companies while providing a great advantage for out-of-state trucking firms."' 9 8 The legislature then enacted the sixty foot limitation with the exemption for border
cities.' 9 9 The Court used this sequence of events to determine
that the purpose of the law was to discourage interstate truck traf200
fic from Iowa's highways.
The events that caused a legislature to turn its attention to a
particular problem will thus sometimes frame the law in its appropriate context. This immediate context is relevant to the issue of
legislative purpose. The next section examines a more difficult
kind of evidence-the "reject all plausible alternatives" form of
proving legislative purpose.
6.

Demanding a Justification: Why Was This ParticularGroup Singled
Out?

Even when legislation fails to address all the potential roots
of a problem, the Court generally acts with deference and does
not find discriminatory classification. Ordinarily, a legislature,
when addressing itself to a problem, may deal with it "one step at
a time." 20 1 "The legislature may select one phase of one field and
193. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 676-78
(1981) (plurality opinion).
194. Id. at 666-67.
195. Id. at 667 (law defended as "reasonable safety measure enacted pursuant to [state's] police power").
196. Id.
197. Id. at 677.
198. Id.
199. Id. The Court then adopted the court of appeals' conclusion "that a
State cannot constitutionally promote its own parochial interests by requiring
safe vehicles to detour around it." Id. at 678 (citing Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 612 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1979), aft'd, 450 U.S. 662
(1981)).
200. Id. at 677-78.
201. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/1

36

Farrell: Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review

1992]

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." 20 2 Thus, the Minnesota legislature, concerned about environmental and energy
problems, can prohibit plastic milk containers but not paper containers, even if both containers are substantially similar in relation
to the legislature's environmental and energy goals.20 3 The legislature need not decide between banning all environmentally
harmful containers and not banning any at all. 20 4 Presumably,
a later
the Minnesota legislature will take the "second step" at
20 5
time, but equal protection does not require it to do so.
Occasionally, however, the Court will inquire further and ask
whether selective impact is in fact evidence of another, less defensible, purpose. 20 6 Where, for example, the government defends a
law on the basis of several somewhat vague and innocuous purposes, but is unable to explain why a particular group has been
singled out to bear the entire burden of a law, a suspicion arises
that the purpose of the law may bear some relation to the group
20 7
singled out.
The Court examined a series of such purported justifications
in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.20 8 In Cleburne, a zoning ordinance required that the city issue a special use permit
before anyone could operate a group home for the mentally retarded. 20 9 The city explained that the purposes of the ordinance
included, inter alia, avoiding concentration of population, lessening congestion in the streets, limiting the number of people who
would occupy a home and protecting against the dangers of
2 10
building on a flood plain.
The Court rejected each of the purported justifications. If
those considerations did in fact underlie the ordinance, then why
202. Id. (citing AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949)).
203. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-66 (1981)
(no requirement that legislation "strike at all evils at the same time or in the
same way" (quoting Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S.
608, 610 (1935))).
204. Id. at 466.

205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (statute, which applied
only to incarcerated appellants, requiring appellant to pay cost of transcript necessary for appeal, constituted invidious discrimination).
207. See Larry G. Simon, Racially PrejudicedGovernmental Actions: A Motivation
Theory of the ConstitutionalBan Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1041, 1114 (1978). Professor Simon calls this use of rationality review the
"flushing out" of real motivation. Id.
208. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
209. Id. at 436 (issue arose when group home operator applied for and was
denied special permit).
210. Id. at 449-50.
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did the city not require special use permits for nursing homes,
sanitariums, hospitals, boarding homes or fraternity houses? 21 1
The Court found that all of these facilities were just as likely to
cause congestion and overcrowding, and to create flood hazards
as would a home for the mentally retarded. 2 12 The mentally retarded were no different in any relevant way from those whose
uses of property were unregulated. 2 13 The fact that the mentally
retarded had been singled out to bear the entire burden of the
law led the Court to conclude that the underlying purpose of the
statute had nothing to do with the asserted concerns. 2 14 Rather,
the Court found that the ordinance rested "on an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded." 2 15 This prejudice reflected
"a bare desire to treat the mentally retarded as outsiders, pariahs
who do not belong in the community." 21 6
The Court's evidentiary approach to legislative purpose in
Cleburne might be called the "reject all plausible alternatives" approach. The Court had no direct evidence before it that the purpose of the zoning ordinance was discrimination against the
mentally retarded (other than the requirement of the ordinance
itself that a special permit be issued). The absence of any plausible, legitimate purpose, however, combined with the singling out
of the retarded, was sufficient evidence of impermissible purpose.
7.

Summary

Once the courts have decided that the actual, rather than the
hypothetical, purpose of a law is significant, then they must consider actual evidence of that purpose. This subpart of the Article
has examined the different types of, and the different weight accorded to, evidence of actual legislative purpose.
C. Burdens of Proof
1. Proving a Case Under the Deferential Version of Rationality Review
The deferential version of rationality review begins with a
211. Id. at 447 (zoning restrictions were only applicable to homes "for the
insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts").
212. Id. at 449-50.
213. Id. at 448 (finding that home for mentally retarded would not
"threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses ...
would not").
214. Id.
215. Id. at 450.
216. Id. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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presumption that statutes are constitutional. 21 7 A plaintiff "must
convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be
true by the governmental decisionmaker." 2 18 1 The government
defendant, however, need not offer any empirical proof in de2 19
fense of the legislative judgment.
Although the challenging plaintiff may offer evidence, a
plaintiff will not prevail simply by proving that the legislature was
wrong. 2 20 In Vance v. Bradley,2 2 1 for example, the plaintiffs challenged a law that required foreign service officers to retire at age
sixty. 222 The Court explained that the government did not have
to offer empirical proof that health and energy tend to decline by
age sixty. 223 Furthermore, the plaintiffs could not prevail simply
by showing that health and energy did not decline at age sixty.
Their burden was to prove that no legislature could reasonably
2 24
have believed this to be true.
When courts apply the rationality standard in this extremely
deferential way, a complaint cannot be drafted that will survive a
motion to dismiss. A plaintiff would have to "hypothesize all conceivable justifications for a statutory classification and then prove
that no legislative body could 'rationally have believed' that the
classification served [any of] the hypothesized purpose[s]. 225
This burden is insurmountable.
217. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314
(1976) (statute requiring uniformed state police officer to retire at age 50 did
not deny equal protection of law; "[sluch action by a legislature is presumed to
be valid").
218. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) (citing Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911)).
219. Id. at 110 n.28 ("The State is not compelled to verify logical assumptions with statistical evidence." (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 794, 812 (1976))).
220. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-64
(1981) (plaintiffs must convince courts that facts assumed by legislature could
not conceivably be true).
221. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
222. Id. at 94-95 (no mandatory retirement age existed for civil service employees, including those serving abroad).
223. Id. at 110-11 & n.28.
224. Id. at 111.
225. Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 420 (N.D.N.Y.
1987) (citing Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 672 (1981)), vacated in part, 888 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1989). Long Island
Lighting provides a lengthy discussion of the evolution of the rational basis test,
establishing a polar approach by comparing the results under Williamson v. Lee
Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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The judicial practice of hypothesizing conceivable purposes
conflicts with the ordinary practice under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under which "[a] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim ... is to be evaluated only on the
pleadings." 2 26 Therefore, for example, a well-pleaded complaint
that alleges that the purpose of a taxing scheme is to promote
domestic business by discriminating against non-resident competitors should be sufficient to state a claim. 22 7 Surely the complaint
will not include any hypothetical, legitimate purposes served by
the statute. If a court limits its review to the facts alleged in the
complaint, a motion to dismiss will fail.
The courts, however, have frequently dismissed complaints
for failure to state a claim even though the complaint alleged facts
that, if proven, would show an impermissible purpose at work. 2 28
The argument outlined above does not take into account the generous amount of hypothesizing that is permitted under deferential rational basis review. As one court explained, because "truth
is not the issue,"2 2 9 the use of discovery procedures to develop
facts showing the state's true reasons for its actions would be
"both inefficient and unnecessary.- 230 The "argument that an evidentiary hearing is required on the rational-basis issue is without
merit."' 23 ' For these reasons, "[g]oing outside the complaint to
hypothesize a purpose will not conflict with the requirement that,
when reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we
226. Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921, 935 (5th Cir. 1988)
(quoting, with minor alteration, O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir.
1985)).
227. Cf Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 (1985). At
issue was the Alabama gross premiums tax which imposed a substantially lower
tax on domestic insurance companies. The tax was held to violate equal protection as applied to appellants. Id. at 871-72, 882.
228. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 898 F.2d 598 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming
trial court's dismissal of complaint alleging that mandatory retirement of state
judges at age 70 discriminates on basis of age; looking to other court opinions to
identify what rational bases would be served by mandatory retirement age), aft'd,
111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991); see also Brown v. City of Lake Geneva, 919 F.2d 1299,
1302 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming trial court's dismissal of complaint alleging that
liquor license denied because of bias, on basis of several purposes offered by
defendant); Mahone, 836 F.2d at 936 (courts may hypothesize purposes on motions to dismiss).
229. Mahone, 836 F.2d at 936 ("task of hypothesizing necessarily renders
less important the actual reasons which the state may have had for making the
challenged classification").
230. Id.
231. Gregory, 898 F.2d at 605 (following highly deferential approach set
forth in Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 (1978)).
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accept as true all well-pleaded facts." 23 2
Rational basis cases are also frequently dismissed at the summary judgment stage. 23 3 A motion for summary judgment is not
to be granted unless "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and ...the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." 2 34 What should a court do when the parties disagree on
the purpose of the law-for example, was a zoning ordinance
adopted to prevent overcrowding or to give effect to the prejudice against the mentally retarded? This disagreement about purpose seems to be an issue of material fact and therefore the case
would not be an appropriate candidate for summary judgment.
Once again, however, deferential review trumps the procedural rules. As one court explained, even if there is a genuine
issue of fact concerning the actual purpose of legislation, that issue of fact is not material.23 5 Evidence of actual purpose is only
minimally relevant to what was material-whether there exists a
23 6
conceivable legitimate purpose for the legislation.
It has long been clear that an extremely deferential version of
rationality review makes it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to
232. Mahone, 836 F.2d at 936.
233. See New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 17
(1988) ("In a case such as this, the plaintiff can carry this burden by submitting
evidence to show that the asserted grounds for the legislative classification lack
any reasonable support in fact, but this burden is nonetheless a considerable
one." (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)));
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) ("[Tlhose challenging the legislative
judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the
governmental decisionmaker." (citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911))); Mountain Water Co. v. Montana Dep't of Pub. Serv.
Regulation, 919 F.2d 593, 596-97 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding distinction between
public and private owned utilities rationally related to hypothesized purposes of
enhancing maintenance and allowing local regulation of water); Howard v. City
of Garland, 917 F.2d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming summary judgment for
defendants where plaintiffs failed to show "the specific requirements of the
[challenged] zoning ordinance for the special use permit are irrational, arbitrary,
or driven by invidious discrimination"); Oriental Health Spa v. City of Fort
Wayne, 864 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1988) (affirming summary judgment where plaintiff failed to offer evidence rebutting constitutionality of ordinance regulating
massage parlors).
234. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
235. See DeSisto College, Inc. v. Town of Howey-in-the-Hills, 706 F. Supp.
1479, 1502 (M.D. Fla.), aff'd sub nom. DeSisto College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 766
(1 th Cir. 1989). It makes no difference whether the plaintiff could show that
members of the governing body enacted the statute out of an irrational fear of
learning disabled students so long as the governing body had evidence before it
that could reasonably be conceived to be true and from which they arrived at
their purported legislative purpose. Id.
236. Id.
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win on the substantive merits of his challenge to government action. The same extreme deference corrupts the language of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The next section examines the
same two procedural motions-the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment-under a more demanding rationality
review.
2.

Proving a Case Under the More Demanding Rationality Review

When the courts consider actual legislative purpose to be the
relevant standard, a plaintiff who alleges that a law was designed
to advance an impermissible purpose will survive a motion to dismiss. 23 7 Further along in the case, a plaintiff who presents evidence of impermissible purpose should survive a defendant's
238
motion for summary judgment.

D.

Summary

Rationality review purports always to be concerned with the
relation between classification and purpose. Where rationality review takes its most deferential form, however, the purpose with
which it purports to be concerned becomes an entirely hypothesized, and ultimately fictional, concept. In such a scheme, evidence of facts becomes entirely irrelevant and the procedural
rules must be interpreted away. On the other hand, when courts
have determined that the actual legislative purpose is relevant,
then a wide range of evidence must be considered to determine
what that purpose was. In such a scheme, it becomes possible for
a claimant to state a case upon which relief can be granted and to
raise genuine issues of material fact.
237. See, e.g., Phan v. Virginia, 806 F.2d 516 (4th Cir. 1986). The district
court had dismissed the complaint of a handicapped student alleging, inter alia,
that the state's refusal to subsidize his tuition at an out-of-state sectarian school
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 517. The court of appeals reversed.
"[W]e proceed from the modest proposition that the simple articulation of a
justification for a challenged classification does not conclude the judicial inquiry." Id. at 521 n.6 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432 (1985)). "We can hypothesize, however, a rational justification for differential treatment of church-affiliated schools based on their location ....
But
this case comes to us not hypothetically but with a record of some proof ....
The record, however is not complete and we conclude that we must remand the
case to the district court [for further fact finding]." Id. at 522-23.
238. See, e.g., Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1990).
Where the plaintiffs alleged that the district's stated reason for denying water
hookups, a water shortage, was pretextual, they raised triable issues of fact surrounding the very existence of a water shortage. Id. The appeals court, therefore, reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/1

42

Farrell: Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review

1992]

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

IV.

WHAT PURPOSES ARE IMPERMISSIBLE?

A.

The Supreme Court Precedents

Although the Supreme Court speaks frequently of permissible or impermissible purposes (i.e., every time it states the doctrine of rationality review), it has not systematically articulated the
criteria that distinguish permissible from impermissible legislative
purposes. On several occasions, however, the Court has suggested a framework for analysis.
As long ago as 1944, in Korematsu v. United States,239 the Court
explained that the internment of Japanese-Americans might be
justified in order to prevent espionage and sabotage during a
time of war, but never as an expression of racial antagonism. 240
Years later in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 24 1 Justice Powell insisted that admissions preferences for students of a
particular race could be justified in order to promote diversity
within the student body, but never as an expression of racial preference for its own sake. 2 42 The theme underlying both cases is
that preferences for one group over another, for their own sake,
are not permissible, but preferential or burdensome effects on
one group rather than another are permissible, so long as the
239. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Supreme Court upheld a military order forbidding all persons ofJapanese ancestry from entering a "military
area." Id. at 219. The Court affirmed the conviction of the petitioner, an American citizen ofJapanese descent, for violating the military order, despite the fact
that the petitioner's home was in the military area and his loyalty to the United
States was not questioned. Id. at 216-18.
240. Id. at 216-17. The Court later explained:
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility
to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the
Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities
feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take
proper security measures ....
Id. at 223.
241. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (judgment of Court announced in opinion by
Justice Powell). Bakke, a white student, filed suit under the Equal Protection
Clause after he was rejected for admission to the University of California Medical School twice, just missing the cutoff both times. Id. at 276-78. The school
had two separate admissions programs: general and special. Id. at 273. The
special admissions program chose 16 out of the 100 students per class from a
pool of "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" and minority applicants. Id. at 274-75. No disadvantaged white applicant was ever admitted under
the special program, however, despite the large numbers who applied to it. Id.
at 276. The Court found that the special program created a racial quota which
had unfairly kept Bakke out of the school by holding 16 places for minority students, some of whom scored significantly lower than Bakke. Id. at 276-81.
242. Id. at 307, 311-15 (diversity of student body "clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education").
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purpose of the law is not discriminatory, but rather to achieve
some broader goal.
Perhaps the Court came closest to articulating a standard of
impermissibility in United States Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno, 243 when it overturned a Food Stamp rule intended to
keep "hippie communes" from participating in the program. The
Court held that the rule was not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest because "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." 244 In order for the government interest to be
legitimate, the harmful effects on hippies must be justified by
"reference to [some independent] considerations in the public
2 45
interest."
Even though virtually every piece of legislation results in a
gain for some persons and a loss for others, "the state must provide a principled justification to explain why some win and some
lose, to explain why Group A may tap the state's limited coffers
and Group B may not." 24 6 Justice Stevens explained the impermissibility standard by reference to the idea of an "impartial
lawmaker," which he thinks is implicit in the concept of rationality.2 4 7 Justice Stevens's "impartial lawmaker" recognizes that a
law may have an adverse impact on the class disfavored by the
statute, but is willing to support the law because "the adverse impact may reasonably be viewed as an acceptable cost of achieving
243. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). The Food Stamp rule, § 3(e) of the Food Stamp
Act of 1964, prevented households from being eligible to receive food stamps if
the household contained a member who was not related to any other member of
the household. Id. at 529.
244. Id. at 534 (small amounts of existing legislative history indicated that
purpose of § 3(e) was to prevent "hippie communes" from participating in Food
Stamp Program).
245. Id. at 534-35 (quoting Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agric., 345 F.
Supp. 310, 314 n. I I (D.D.C. 1972)). The government claimed that reducing
fraud in the Food Stamp Program was a legitimate public interest furthered by
§ 3(e). Id. at 535. The Court disagreed, however, because even if an increase in
food stamp fraud existed in households containing unrelated persons, denying
aid to all such households was not a rational way to handle the problem. Id. at
535-36. Further, the Court noted that another section of the Food Stamp Act
was drafted specifically to prevent fraud, making it doubtful that § 3(e) was
drafted with that purpose in mind. Id. at 536-37.
246. Bishop v. Moran, 676 F. Supp. 416, 423 (D.R.I. 1987) (under the
Equal Protection Clause, prisoners involuntarily imprisoned out-of-state are entitled to be brought back into state at state's expense to attend parole hearings
because prisoners incarcerated in state were allowed to appear at parole
hearings).
247. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452
(1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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a larger goal." 248 That larger goal, however, must be a "public
purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disad249
vantaged class."
On other occasions, the Court has explained the impermissibility standard by reference to the term "invidious discrimination." 2 50 A classification is invidious if drawn "with an evil eye
and an unequal hand," 25 1 or motivated by a "feeling of antipathy" 2 52 against a specific group. These invidious discriminations
are distinguished from laws that impose special burdens, which
are often necessary for general benefits. 25 3 Thus, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits invidious discrimination, but does not invalidate the rule that burdens some in order to provide general
benefits, even if the legislature has miscalculated the costs and
benefits.2 5 4 From this perspective, rationality review cannot be
said to prohibit unwise or foolish laws, but rather only biased
laws.
It follows, therefore, that it is appropriate to adopt a zoning
plan in order to promote an appropriate use of land, even though
the plan adversely affects certain persons; but it is not appropriate
248. Id. at 452 n.4 (Stevens,J., concurring) (quoting United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
249. Id. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens opined that no applicable public purpose existed for forbidding the group home in this particular
case, even though other restrictions on the mentally retarded, such as the right
to drive cars, may be legitimate. Id. at 452-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).
250. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)
("The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.").
251. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). The Court held
that the application of an ordinance requiring a permit to operate a laundry in a
building not made of stone or brick was discriminatory and violative of the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 374. Even though the ordinance appeared valid on its
face as a means of preventing fires, the ordinance was used to discriminate
against persons of Chinese decent by denying permits to hundreds of Chinese
persons for no reason. Id.
252. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1885) (upholding ordinance that forbid operation of a laundry between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. because
language and legislative history of ordinance did not indicate intent to discriminate against class of persons, and ordinance in practice did not operate only
against that certain class).
253. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (finding ordinance controlling laundry business to be valid because it promoted public goals of health
and fire prevention, even though it subjected class of laundry owners to special
burdens).
254. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 468-69
(1981). The Court showed that it would uphold a statute that prohibited the use
of plastic milk containers in order to save energy, even if the legislature was
factually wrong-that is, even though the production of plastic milk containers
required more energy than the production of paper containers. Id. at 469.
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to adopt a zoning plan in order to exclude the mentally retarded.2 5 5 Similarly, it is appropriate to preserve the fiscal integrity of state welfare programs, even though some people are
adversely affected; but it is not appropriate to limit benefits in order to keep out indigents and out-of-staters. 2 6 Likewise, it is appropriate to provide veterans' educational benefits only to those
who serve in the armed forces for the purpose of "mak[ing] military service more attractive;" but it is not appropriate to limit
those benefits in order to punish conscientious objectors for their
25 7
beliefs.
The Court's cases are consistent, with one exception. They
consistently hold that a state may not purposely prefer A over B
for A's own sake, but it may enact laws to serve public purposes,
even if the effect of those laws is to benefit A more than B. The
single exception to this understanding comes from Zobel v. Williams. 2 58 In Zobel, the Court invalidated an Alaska statute that distributed a portion of Alaska's oil revenues on the basis of years of
residency, starting from the first year of statehood. 25 9 The Court
held that the legislative purpose of rewarding citizens for past
contributions was not legitimate.2 60 This view is plainly inconsistent, however, with the Court's previous approval of veterans'
benefits programs, established for the purpose of rewarding veterans for past contributions. 26 ' Zobel also suggested that the state
255. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. at 432, 448
(1985).
256. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding statutory provisions denying welfare benefits to residents of less than one year, in order to
prevent the influx of indigents seeking higher welfare payments, violative of
Equal Protection Clause), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974).
257. Johnson v. Ribison, 415 U.S. 361, 383 (1974) (purpose of veterans'
educational benefits is to help veterans "readjust to civilian life" and make service in military more attractive; any burden to persons unable to serve in military
due to religious beliefs is merely incidental).
258. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
259. Id. at 65. Each adult citizen received one dividend per year of residency after 1959. Id. at 57.
260. Id. at 63. The Court disagreed with the past contribution rationale
because it feared this analysis could be expanded to the point that citizens would
be divided into "expanding numbers of permanent classes," so that all benefits
and burdens would be apportioned in a similar manner. Id. at 64.
261. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 265, 280-81 (1979).
The veterans' hiring preference in Massachusetts, as in other jurisdictions, has traditionally been justified as a measure designed to reward
veterans for the sacrifice of military service ....
Absolute and permanent preferences, as the troubled history of this law
demonstrates, have always been subject to the objection that they give

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/1

46

Farrell: Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review

1992]

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

may not set state insurance or pension benefits at levels designed
to recognize past contributions to the state.2 62 This, of course, is
26 3
not the law.
There is an impermissible purpose at work in the Alaska statute, but it is not rewarding citizens for past contributions. Rather,
the problem is that the purpose of the law is to prefer more established residents over newcomers, for their own sake, without reference to any larger public purpose.2 6 4 In defense of the statute,
one might argue that the years of residency measurement was
designed as a shorthand for identifying past contributions. If so,
the distinctions drawn by the statute were an extremely crude approximation. In order for the past contributions analysis to be
true, we must assume that persons who had been children or unemployed for the previous twenty-one years had made substantial
contributions to the state and that those who arrived more recently to build the Alaska pipeline had made insignificant contributions. 265 The more obvious explanation of the statute and the
Court's invalidation of it was that the statute was based on the
impermissible premise that some persons are worthier than
others. Thus, a legislative purpose is impermissible if it prefers
one group over another without trying to benefit the general
welfare.
the veteran more than a square deal. But the Fourteenth Amendment
"cannot be made a refuge from ill-advised ... laws."
Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 150 (1909)).
262. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 64 ("Alaska's reasoning could open the door to state
apportionment of other rights, benefits, and services according to length of
residency.").
263. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 n.10 (1969) ("We are not
dealing here with state insurance programs which may legitimately tie the
amount of benefits to the individual's contributions."), overruled on other grounds
by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
264. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 71 (Brennan,J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated:
[R]esort[ing] to duration of residence as the basis for a distribution of
state largesse does closely track the constitutionally untenable position
that the longer one's residence, the worthier one is of the State's favor.
In my view, it is difficult to escape from the recognition that underlying
any scheme of classification on the basis of duration of residence, we
shall almost invariably find the unstated premise that "some citizens are
more equal than others." We rejected that premise . . . when we
adopted the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
265. See id. at 77-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted
that new residents may have contributed more to Alaska than some of the natives. Thus, length of residency is not an accurate method to gauge past contributions to the state. Id. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The Scholarly Debate: Promoting the Public Good or Advancing
Private Interests?

The Supreme Court's view of impermissible purpose can be
pieced together from the cases discussed in the previous section.
What is perhaps not evident from the Court's discussion is the
significance of the issue. The question of impermissible legislative purposes implicates more than rationality review. In fact, it
raises questions about the nature of the legislative process and
the nature of representative government in a democracy. These
broader questions have provoked a scholarly debate between followers of two conflicting theories-the public value model and
the interest group model.
1.

The Public Value Model

More than forty years ago, Tussman and tenBroek considered the judicial tolerance of departures from the strict requirements of the principle of equality.2 66 They asked, "[W]hat is a
26 7
'fair reason' for over-riding the demand for equal treatment? "
Were political considerations, including winning re-election and
They
appeasing interest groups, appropriate factors?2 68
answered:
[T]he requirement that laws be equal rests upon a theory
of legislation quite distinct from that of pressure
groups-a theory which puts forward some conception
of a "general good" as the "legitimate public purpose"
at which legislation must aim, and according to which
the triumph of private or group pressure marks the cor266. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 5. The doctrine of reasonable classification permits the legislature to classify people so long as persons similarly
situated are treated similarly. Id. at 344. A problem arises, however, when only
part of the group targeted by the legislation is affected. Id. at 348. Tussman and
tenBroek are concerned with the judicial tolerance of legislation that does not
affect all persons similarly situated, in the targeted group, in the same way. Id. at
348-49.
267. Id. at 349. In other words, when is it acceptable to allow part of a
group to be affected by legislation, while others similarly situated are not
affected?
268. Id. at 349-50. Tussman and tenBroek understand the need for judicial
deference to less than perfect legislative classifications when administrative difficulties prevent treating everyone similarly situated in the same manner. Id.
They question, however, judicial deference to the legislature's classification decisions made with political considerations in mind. Tussman and tenBroek recognize that a legislature may feel limited in what "it can do-and still be reelected," if retribution at the polls is probable unless a specific group is "given
special classificatory treatment in a law." Id. at 350.
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ruption of the legislative process. 26 9
Obvious to Tussman and tenBroek then, and still clear today, rationality review only makes sense if one adopts the public value
model. Under the public value model, a broader public purpose
exists at which laws must aim and against which laws are
measured.
Professor Cass Sunstein, perhaps today's leading proponent
of the public value model, has published a series of articles in
which he develops the public value model and finds support for it
2 70
in the historical background and structure of the Constitution.
Professor Sunstein distinguishes "naked preferences"- unprincipled distributions of resources and opportunities that reflect the
view that it is intrinsically desirable to treat one person better
than another 27 1 -from "public values," defined negatively as
"any justification for government action that goes beyond the exercise of raw political power." 27 2 Professor Sunstein's argument
is that a number of clauses in the Constitution, including the
Equal Protection Clause, can best be explained as prohibiting naked preferences, thereby insisting that laws must promote public
purposes.273
Sunstein finds support for the public value model of government in the Constitution itself. He first finds that "[t]he prohibition of naked preferences captures a significant theme in the
original intent" of the framers-related to the "concern of ensur269. Id. Otherwise, the law will reflect the will of the strongest interest
groups and will inherently not provide equal protection of the laws. Id.
270. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539
(1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival] (examining republican principles in founding period and effect of republicanism on modern public law); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985)
(discussing problem of powerful private interest groups influencing American
public law); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked Preferences] (examining constitutional prohibition of "naked preferences," i.e., "the distribution of resources...
to one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have
exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want"); Sunstein, Public
Values, supra note 1 (examining Equal Protection Clause, its focus and recent
effect).
271. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 270, at 1689, 1693-94 (defining "naked preferences"); Sunstein, Public Values, supra note 1, at 131, 137.
272. Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 270, at 1694. Thus, the least that
the prohibition of naked preferences requires is that "government action bejustified by reference to some public value." Id. at 1694 n.29.
273. Id. at 1689. Sunstein includes within his theory "many of the most
important clauses of the Constitution: the dormant, commerce, privileges and
immunities, equal protection, due process, contract, and eminent domain
clauses." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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ing against capture of government power by faction." 274 Further,
Sunstein argues that the prohibition of naked preferences "reflects the Constitution's roots in civil republicanism and accompanying conceptions of civic virtue," the common good and the
value of deliberation and debate. 2 75 Finally, he argues that the
structural provisions of the Constitution reflect the prohibition of
naked preferences, specifically noting the separation of powers
provisions designed to limit the powers of self-interested factions. 2 76 In this way, Sunstein makes a reasonably strong case for
his public value theory based on the Constitution.
Sunstein's constitutionally-based public value theory is not
without its problems or detractors, however. One problem,
which Sunstein himself recognizes, is that "the line between public value and naked preference is quite thin." 2 77 For example,
how is one to know whether a wealth transfer to a particular
group is a classic case of capture by faction, or a legitimate attempt at promoting a public purpose? Additionally, as times
change, so do our perceptions of public good.2 78 For example, at
the end of the nineteenth century, minimum wage and maximum
hour laws were considered impermissible class legislation; today,
however, they are viewed as promoting public purposes.2 79 Similarly, today we argue about a cut in the capital gains tax-is it a
payoff to the wealthy or a careful plan to stimulate the economy
and thus provide broad public benefits? To the extent that no
274. Id. at 1690 ("The framers' hostility toward naked preferences was
rooted in the fear that government power would be usurped solely to distribute
wealth or opportunities to one group or person at the expense of another.").
275. Id. at 1690-91. Under the view of civil republicanism, legislators must
not bow to private pressure, but rather strive for the common good. Id.; see also
Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 270.
276. Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 270, at 1691. The power of selfinterested factions is limited by the predetermined constraints placed upon government power by the separation of powers. Id.
277. Id. at 1728. Unfortunately, it is usually possible to find some public
value that justifies treating one group differently than another. Id.
278. See id. at 1702 ("[Tlhe use of such theories [of impermissible government ends] may allow constitutional prohibitions to change dramatically over
time as the category of public value expands and contracts.").
279. Id. at 1701.
During the Lochner era, for example, the redistribution of resources
from employer to employee was not thought to respond to a public
value and was therefore placed in the category of naked preferences.
Numerous goals now considered to fall within the realm of public values were not recognized as such, largely because common law conceptions of rights and obligations dominated early public law ....
Under current law, by contrast, all sorts of redistributive measures
are permissible.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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clear answers to questions like these exist, Sunstein's theory will
280
not provide concrete results in particular cases.
Another criticism of Sunstein's theory is that he is swimming
against a process-oriented current. Sunstein, by stating "[ilt is
frankly substantive, '2 81 declared outright that his theory is not
process-based. Substantive theories are criticized because they
allow non-elected judges to substitute their values for the values
adopted by the democratically-elected legislature. For example,
Gerald Gunther's influential 1971 article argued that courts
should closely scrutinize the means chosen by legislatures, but
2 82
should leave the choice of ends to the democratic process.
Likewise, in Democracy and Distrust, Professor Ely argued for a
"participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to
judicial review" wherein "the selection and accommodation of
substantive values is left almost entirely to the political process." 2 8 3 Hence, Sunstein's public value model clearly conflicts
with the process theories. By grounding his model in the Constitution, however, Sunstein suggests that the Constitution itself
places limits on the ends that a majority of the legislature may
pursue. Thus, judicial review limited solely to issues of process
would be inadequate to perform the job assigned to the courts by
the Constitution.
One can find further support for the public value model of
government in the works of several modern liberal political theorists. John Rawls' A Theory of Justice requires that "[a]ll social
values ... are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distri280. See Stephen M. Feldman, Exposing Sunstein s Naked Preferences, 1989
L.J. 1335, 1343 ("Consequently, in constitutional adjudication, the question whether a legislative action is based on either a naked preference or a public
value does not have a neutral, objective, and preexisting answer .... Sunstein's
theory of judicial review, lacking the support of its foundation, shudders,
groans, and ultimately collapses.").
281. Sunstein, Public Values, supra note 1, at 138 (Sunstein's theory is substantive because "it grows out of a particular perception of the substantive evil
forbidden by the [Equal Protection] Clause.").
282. See generally Gunther, supra note 103. The article discusses Supreme
Court decisions for the 1971 term that pertain to the Court's treatment and development of rationality review. See id. at 42 ("In reality, the primary evil of the
discredited [Lochner] doctrine was the dogmatic judicial intervention regarding
ends, not means."); id. at 43 ("The old equal protection was always means-oriented; unlike due process, it had not added a substantive dimension focusing on
the legitimacy of ends." (footnote omitted)); id. at 44 ("It does indeed follow
from the political process theme that legislative value choices warrant judicial
deference so long as the people can have their say in the public forum and at the
ballot box.").
283. ELY, supra note 48, at 87. Thus, Ely's approach to judicial review completely supports the "American system of representative democracy." Id. at 88.
DUKE
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bution... is to everyone's advantage." 28 4 That would mean that
a legislature might confer special benefits on a particular group,
but only if that preference benefits all-that is, promotes a public
value. Similarly, Ronald Dworkin insists that the government
treat people with "equal concern and respect." 2 85 "It must not
distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the ground that
some citizens are entitled to more because they are worthy of
more concern." 28 6 Under Sunstein's theory, such an unequal distribution would be called a naked preference. Likewise, in Bruce
Ackerman's SocialJustice in the Liberal State, the principle of "Neutrality" prohibits an exercise of power either on the ground that
the power holder is intrinsically superior to his fellow citizens or
on the ground that his conception of the good is better than that
of his fellow citizens.2 87 Clearly this is a prohibition of naked
preferences. Thus, despite criticism, Sunstein's public value
model finds support in the Constitution, as well as in the works of
several renowned modern political theorists.
2.

The Interest Group Model

The principal competitor of the public value model of government is a theory variously called the interest group model, 2 88
pressure group theory, 289 pluralism 290 and, recently, public
choice theory. 2 9 1 This model purports to describe the legislative
process as it is, not as it ought to be, and leaves no room for
altruism in the legislative process it describes.
Tussman and tenBroek identified the "pressure group" the284. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) ("Injustice, then, is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.").
285. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-73 (1977). This is
one of the fundamental postulates comprising Dworkin's definition of equality.
286. Id. at 273. Clearly, Dworkin supports the public value theory and its
prohibition of naked preferences. For Sunstein's definition of naked preferences, see supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
287. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11 (1980)
(thrust of neutrality "is that nobody has the right to vindicate political authority
by asserting a privileged insight into the moral universe which is denied the rest
of us").
288. Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence,supra note 56, at 873 (theorizing that
interest groups control legislative process).
289. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 5, at 350 (when group pressure
prevails, legislative process is corrupted).
290. Farber & Frickey,Jurisprudence,supra note 56, at 875 (under pluralism
theory, balance of private political power is reflected in legislative outcomes).
291. Id. at 878 (public choice theory applies economic principles to legislative process). For a discussion of the public choice theory, see infra notes 297304 and accompanying text.
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ory of government, which holds that "a law is properly the resultant of pressures exerted by competing interests." 29 2 Politics is
considered to be a struggle between interest groups.2 93 Each
group pursues its own advantage and hopes to gain benefits at the
expense of less powerful, or less well-organized, interest groups.
In such a model, success is defined as getting your way at the expense of others. Of course, it is to be expected that interest
groups will sometimes have to compromise 294 or form coalitions
with other groups, but these tactics are solely a means for advancing the ultimate group interest. In such a system, the concept of
the public interest is under attack and acts merely to cover the
actual workings of the legislative process. 29 5 Thus, the purpose
of government, from the perspective of the interest group theory,
is the aggregation of individual preferences and not the identification of public values. This means that the successful passage of a
law by the majority of the legislature is itself a sufficient justifica2 96
tion for the law, requiring no independent public welfare basis.
The contemporary version of the interest group model is
economic: it applies economic principles of the market to the legislative process. 29 7 This model is called the public choice theory.
Under the public choice theory, legislators and interest groups
are presumed to act in their own self-interest. 298 Legislators want
to get re-elected; interest groups want to advance their interests.2 99 Therefore, legislators and interest groups make deals
292. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 5, at 350. Thus, the stronger the
group, the more likely its members are to obtain favorable, and therefore unequal, legislation. Id.
293. Id. at 349-50; Farber & Frickey,Jurisprudence,supra note 56, at 883-84.
Some of the literature on interest group politics is summarized in Farber &
Frickey,Jurisprudence,supra note 56, at 883-90.
294. Farber & Frickey, Jurisprudence, supra note 56, at 884 (citing EARL
LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS

35 (1952)).

295. Posner, supra note 135, at 27 ("The ability of such [interest] groups to
obtain legislation derives from their money, votes, cohesiveness, ability to make
credible threats of violence or other disorder if their demands are not met, and
other factors all totally unrelated to the abstract merit of the policy at issue." (emphasis
added)).
296. Id. at 29. Posner draws the line, however, at legislation that clearly
"infringes upon a clear and definite constitutional goal," for example, forbidding discrimination by the government on the basis of race. Id. at 29-30. Thus,
even if the majority could pass such a discriminating law, the courts would invalidate it, so that a blatantly unconstitutional law does not justify itself. Id. at 30.
297. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1979) (describing public
choice theory of government, based upon economic analysis).
298. Farber & Frickey,Jurisprudence, supra note 56, at 891.
299. Id. at 891-92. Presumably, the self-interest of the legislators is to win
re-election. Id. at 891. Thus, legislators must "maximize their appeal to their
constituents" by acting in the best economic interests of their constituents. Id.
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which allow both to achieve their goals, even though this results
in "rent-seeking" at the expense of the general public. 3 00
It is not at all certain that the description of the legislative
process in the public choice literature is accurate. Mark Kelman
has argued that the public choice view of human character is shallow and incomplete, 301 that some of its basic propositions are assumed rather than proven 30 2 and that its most basic claim about
the motivation of public officials is groundless. 30 3 While the public choice assumption (that self-interest is the only thing that matters) may be accurate in many instances, it is both cynical and
"profoundly false" to conclude that considerations of the public
interest are not important to many legislators.3 0 4 Even if one
were to concede the factual accuracy of the public choice claim,
there is a more basic concern with the model. The public choice
theory jumps from a purported description of how the legislature
acts to an implicit judgment that this is the way the legislature
ought to act. Just because something is a certain way does not
mean that it ought to be that way. This assumption is profoundly
unsound.
With regard to the permissibility of legislative purposes, it
should be obvious that the interest group theory of government
turns the public value model on its head. The unprincipled distribution of resources to A instead of B, for A's own sake, rather
than being a prohibited naked preference, turns out to be the
at 891-92. In this way, the individual legislator's votes can be easily predicted by
examining the economic interests of her constituents. Id. at 892.
300. Macey, supra note 56, at 224 n.6. Rent-seeking is defined as "the attempt to obtain economic rents . . . through government intervention in the
market. A classic example of rent-seeking is a corporation's attempt to obtain
monopolies granted by the government. Such monopolies allow firms to raise
prices above competitive levels. The increased income is economic rent from
government regulation." Id.
301. Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing. A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical
and "Empirical" Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199, 206
(1988). Kelman criticizes the public choice view that people, even in their
nonpolitical conduct such as love, marriage and divorce, are merely wealth-max-

imizers. Id. at 206-07 (citing

GARY BECKER,

A

TREATISE ON THE FAMILY

67-82

(1981) and Becker, A Theory of Marriage (pt. 1), 81 J. POL. ECON. 813 (1973)).
302. See, e.g., id. at 214. For example, Kelman states that the public choice
proposition that voters vote to maximize their economic position is "highly debatable." Id.
303. Id. at 223. Public choice theorists state that the only motivation of
public officials is "financial selfishness." Kelman disagrees by strongly asserting
that motives other than personal finances exist. Id.
304. Id. at 213-14 ("It is not surprising, though, that people in the public
sphere are not invariably simple selfish wealth-seekers ....
[but rather] demonstrate more complex motivation.").
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very essence of the democratic process. 3 0 5 This emphasis on allowing the democratic process to work without interference
would be more appropriate in a pure democracy, where all of the
choices were left to the majority. The American system, however,
is a constitutional democracy, in which a number of choices have
been taken away from the majority. The Constitution expresses
the concern that, in certain areas, the majority is likely to trample
on the rights and interests of the minority--exactly what would
happen under the interest group model. But Sunstein's public
value model, and the permissible purpose requirement of rationality review, limit such an exercise of the will of the majority, thus
protecting the rights of minorities and upholding the
Constitution.
Thus, it is quite clear that if we take rationality review as our
starting point, the Constitution favors the public value model of
government and is inconsistent with interest group theory. This
is because rationality review insists that legislative judgments be
directed towards a public good, while, under the interest group
model, the passage of a law by a majority is itself sufficient justification for that law. Judge Posner, however, suggests a different
starting point. Admitting that rationality review and the interest
group theory are incompatible, Posner concludes that the problem is with rationality review rather than with the interest group
theory.3 0 6 The language of the Constitution, after all, requires
only equal protection of the laws, not a rational relationship between classification and public purpose.
The Supreme Court, however, has not followed Judge Posner's lead, as it continues to proclaim the doctrine of rationality
review. Implicitly, at least, the Court seems to have accepted
Sunstein's view that the public value model, embodied in the ra305. Posner, supra note 135, at 27-28. For a further discussion of Posner's
theories, see supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
306. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 586-87 (3d ed.

1986).
There is a long-standing debate over whether the Supreme Court
should use the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state legislation that, even though it
does not infringe a specific constitutional right such as freedom of
speech, is unreasonable as judged by some general criterion of social
welfare or public interest. Economic analysis suggests that the assertion of such a power by the Supreme Court would change fundamentally the nature of the democratic political process-an objective that
cannot reasonably be attributed to the framers of the Constitution or
consistently attained by the Court.
Id. at 586.
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tionality requirement, is in fact derived from the Constitution. In
practice, however, the Court falls far short of a generalized endorsement of the public value model. To the extent that the
Court deferentially hypothesizes public values as legislative purposes, it allows private interests to pursue private advantage
through the legislative process. When this happens, the public
value model is nothing more than an academic theory, imposing
no real limitations on the work of actual legislatures. The next
part of this Article examines the Court at work, inconsistently applying the doctrine of rationality review.
V.

RECONSIDERING THE PRECEDENTS

This Article began with the assertion that rationality review is
unpredictable. As Justice Marshall has argued, there seems to be
two rationality reviews: an extremely deferential one, and a "second order" rationality review that closely examines actual legislative purpose and is willing to proscribe certain legislative ends as
impermissible. 30 7 The deferential review never results in the invalidation of a statute. The more demanding review, on the other
hand, when applied, usually results in the invalidation of the challenged statute. Thus, the choice of the method of review preordains the results.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never explained how
to decide which form of review is appropriate in a particular
case. 30 It has been suggested that the Court uses the more demanding form of rationality review when a semi-suspect class or a
semi-fundamental right is involved.3 0 9 However, the Court itself
307. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 458
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall
criticized the opinion of the Court because it stated that mental retardation is
not a quasi-suspect class requiring a heightened standard ofjudicial review, but
then proceeded to apply such heightened scrutiny analysis under the name of
the rational-basis test. Id. at 457-58 (Marshall,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, the Cleburne Court created a "second order" rational-basis
test that is distinct from the previously deferential rational-basis test. Id. at 458
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
308. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Moreover, by failing to articulate the factors that justify today's 'second order'
rational-basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for determining when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.").
309. See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 414,
417 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The Supreme Court's occasional departures from the
extreme deference .

.

. rational basis analysis .

.

. have been limited to cases

involving classifications that infringed on rights that are 'almost' fundamental or
singled out classes that are 'almost' suspect.").
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has rejected this reasoning.3 1 0 What is left is a rationality review
that is deferential and undemanding in most cases, but occasionally, though unpredictably, becomes a tight noose around the
neck of the legislature.
This section is a case study of this unpredictability. Eight
cases will be examined-four in which the Court used a demanding standard of review to invalidate a challenged statute and four
in which the Court used an extremely deferential standard to uphold a statute. The facts of each case will be examined under the
opposite form of review from that applied by the Court, showing
that the form of review determines the outcome of the case.
A.

FindingPermissible Purposes Where the Court Found None

Consider first, four cases in which the Court invalidated legislation on rationality grounds. In each case, the Court found that
the legislative purpose was impermissible. These cases will be reconsidered under the Court's extremely deferential review, where
the only requirement is that a rational legislature could have rationally believed that a law furthered a legitimate government
31
interest. '
In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,3 12 the Court
invalidated an amendment to the Food Stamp Act that denied
benefits to households made up of unrelated individuals.3 13 The
Court found that the actual purpose of the law was to keep "hippie communes" out of the Food Stamp Program.3 1 4 The Court
held that purpose to be impermissible. Had the Court chosen to
310. See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 459 (1988)
(refusing to apply heightened scrutiny to an equal protection claim to education
services and limiting Plyler v. Doe to its "unique circumstances"); Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370-73 (1988) (refusing to apply heightened
scrutiny of Moreno rational basis test to case involving denial of food stamps to
households of striking workers); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446 ("Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious discrimination.").
311. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1981).
The legislature is not required to be correct in deciding that a law advances a
legitimate government interest, so long as its decision is rationally debatable.
Id. at 464. For a discussion of the burden of proof under the deferential version
of rationality review, see supra notes 217-36 and accompanying text.
312. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). For a further discussion of Moreno, see supra
notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
313. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
314. Id. at 534 ("The legislative history ... indicates that the amendment
was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp program." (quoting in part statement of Sen. Holland)
(citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1793, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1970)).
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be deferential, the result would have been different. It is quite
clear that Congress could have adopted this amendment in order to
minimize fraud in the administration of the Food Stamp Program. 31 5 Congress could have thought that the requirement that
individuals be related guarantees that the household did not
come into existence solely for the purpose of collecting food
stamps. 3 16 Thus, the classification-unrelated individualswould have a sufficient relation to a permissible government purpose-preventing fraud. Under the deferential standard, the adverse effect on hippies would be considered incidental.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. ,317 the Court
invalidated, as applied, a city zoning ordinance that required a
special use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded. 3a
The Court found that the purpose of the law was simply to give
effect to prejudice against the mentally retarded, which was an
impermissible purpose. 3 19 Had the Court chosen to be deferential, the result would have been different. The city could have
adopted the zoning ordinance in order to "lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion
and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people." 320 The
Court had already found these to be permissible objectives of the
zoning function. 32i Conceivably, the thrust of the ordinance in
Cleburne is no more aimed at the mentally retarded than the ordinance in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas322 was aimed at college stu315. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I do not believe that the asserted congressional concern with the fraudulent use of food stamps is... quite
as irrational as the Court seems to believe.").
316. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Court noted, however, that two
otherwise qualified unrelated persons living together may create "two separate
'households,' both of which are eligible for assistance." Id. at 537. Therefore,
Justice Rehnquist concluded, the motive for § 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act was
not likely to be the prevention of fraud. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
317. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). For a further discussion of Cleburne, see supra
notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
318. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450.
319. Id. ("[Riequiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded ....").
320. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). For a further
discussion of Village of Belle Terre, see infra note 322 and accompanying text.
321. Id. at 5-6, 9 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) ("It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean ....")).
322. Village of Belle Terre involved a zoning ordinance that restricted all land
use to single family dwellings. Id. at 2. The ordinance defined "family" as
"[o]ne or more persons related by blood, adoption, or marriage, living and
cooking together as a single housekeeping unit, exclusive of household servants," although up to two unrelated persons living as a housekeeping unit
would also constitute a family. Id. The ordinance was challenged by landlords

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss1/1

58

Farrell: Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review

1992]

LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE

dents wanting to live together. In both cases, under the
deferential standard, the city should be able to proceed one step
3 23
at a time toward the accomplishment of its zoning goals.
In Plyler v. Doe,3 2 4 the Court invalidated a Texas statute that
denied free public education to undocumented alien school age
children. 3 25 The Court explained the result, in part, by insisting
that the state had not chosen particularly effective means to accomplish its goals.3 26 Clearly, this close scrutiny of means is not
at all deferential. In addition, the Court insisted that the state
explain "its selection of this group as the appropriate target for
exclusion." 3 27 The implication of this comment is that, as in
Cleburne, exclusion of this group was itself the purpose of the
law-an impermissible purpose. Had the Court chosen to be deferential, it could have accepted any one of the purposes suggested by the state, such as mitigating the harsh economic effects
of sudden shifts in population. The state should not be required
to prove that such harsh economic effects would necessarily result
from the influx of illegal immigrants, rather only that the legislature could have believed that, and also could have believed that excluding undocumented children from schools bore some relation
who had been found in violation after leasing a house in the village to six college
students. The Court held that the statute did not violate equal protection because it was rationally related to the permissible government interest in "quiet
place[s] where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted." Id. at

9.
323. For a discussion of the permissibility of the legislature proceeding towards its goals one step at a time, see supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.

324. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
325. Id. at 230. The Texas statute at issue in Plyler withheld state funds
from local school districts for undocumented alien school children and "authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to children
not 'legally admitted' to the country." Id. at 250 (citing TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981)). The statute was challenged, as violative of
equal protection, inter alia, by a class of children of Mexican origin unable to
establish legal admission to the United States. Id. at 206. The state advanced the
governmental interests of preserving their limited resources for the education of
lawful residents, and discouraging aliens from illegally immigrating. Id. at 22728. The Court declined to treat illegal aliens as a suspect class, but nevertheless
invalidated the statute because the state failed to show that the exclusion "further[ed] some substantial state interest." Id. at 223, 230.
326. Id. at 228-30 (citing Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D. Tex.
1978) (charging undocumented children tuition is ineffective way of preventing
illegal aliens from entering the country "at least when compared with the alternative of prohibiting the employment of illegal aliens").
327. Id.at 229. The state claimed that undocumented children were singled out because they burden "the State's ability to provide high-quality public
education," and because they are less likely to use their education for productive
use within the state. Id. at 229-30. The Court disagreed, and found no relationship between the denial and furthering a legitimate state interest. Id. at 230.
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to this concern. Surely the challenged statute could had survived
this test.
In Zobel v. Williams,3 28 the Court invalidated an Alaska statute
that distributed a portion of oil revenues to its citizens on the basis of years of residency in Alaska counting from the first year of
statehood.3 29 The Court found that the statute was designed to
reward citizens for past contributions, which was an impermissible purpose. 33 0 Had the Court been deferential, however, it
would not have rejected the other purposes submitted by the
state. For example, the legislature could have believed that this
distribution would create a financial incentive for individuals to
establish and maintain residence in Alaska. 3 3 ' Although there
was no need to give older residents a greater financial incentive
than more recent residents, clearly the legislature could have believed that this distribution would advance the goal to some extent. That is all that the deferential rationality review is said to
require.
The point of this discussion is not that these four cases were
wrongly decided. Rather, the point is that they were not decided
under the traditional deferential rationality standard, and that the
standard applied by the Court determines the outcome of the
case.
B.

Finding Impermissible Purposes Where the Court Found None

In the next set of four rationality cases, the Court was extremely deferential to the legislative judgment. However, had the
Court applied the stricter standard of Moreno, Cleburne, Plyler and
Zobel, these next four cases would have been resolved differently.
In Lyng v. InternationalUnion, UA W,332 the Court considered a
challenge to an amendment that excluded striking workers from
the Food Stamp Program. On its facts, this case is extremely similar to Moreno. 333 Had the Court chosen to look for it, there was
328. 457 U.S. 55 (1982).
329. Id. at 65.
330. Id. at 63. For the Court's analysis of the purpose of this law, see supra
notes 258-65 and accompanying text.
331. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 61. The state advanced three purposes for the statute: (1) to financially encourage people to move to Alaska and establish residency there; (2) to promote careful investment decisions about the Permanent
Fund; and (3) to reward the past contributions of citizens. Id. Nevertheless, the
Court summarily dismissed the first two purposes as unsupportive of the state's
goals. Id. at 62.
332. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
333. For a discussion ofMoreno, see supra notes 243-45, 312-16 and accom-
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some evidence that the amendment had been adopted as a strikebreaking tool, "an effort to increase the power of management
over workers, using food as a weapon." 334 Clearly, such a purpose would be a classic naked preference, and thus impermissible.
The Court instead found that the purpose of the amendment was
"the legitimate governmental objective of avoiding undue favoritism to one side or the other in private labor disputes."3 3 5 The
Court refused to review the assertion that withdrawing government benefits from only the labor side of a labor dispute is far
from neutral, especially considering the numerous benefits that
management received from the government regardless of the occurrence of a labor dispute. 33 6 Under the Moreno standard of review, the Court would have looked closely at this claim and might
have reached the opposite result, thus invalidating the statute.
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. 33 7 was a classic example
ofjudicial deference to legislative judgment in economic matters.
The Court upheld a statute that prohibited the sale of milk in
plastic cartons. 33 8 The Minnesota trial court, however, had previously concluded that the actual purpose of the law was to promote some segments of the dairy and pulpwood industries at the
33 9
expense of other segments of the dairy and plastics industries.
Again, this would appear to be a classic naked preference-an attempt to advance the interests of A over B for A's own sakewhich is clearly an impermissible purpose requiring invalidation
of the statute. The Supreme Court arrived at the opposite conclusion, finding that the legislative purposes were the environpanying text. Both cases deal with the intent of the legislature to prevent a specific group from participating in the federal Food Stamp Program. Lyng, 485
U.S. at 384 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
334. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 384 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
464, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1977)).
335. Id. at 371. The Court felt that allowing strikers to benefit from the
Food Stamp Program turned food stamps into a "weapon" against the management in labor disputes. Id.
336. Id. at 381-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that
government loans, government contracts, the protection of the Bankruptcy Act
and tax subsidies do not depend upon the management of a business refraining
from labor disputes. Id. at 382 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, withdrawing
food stamp benefits from strikers "amounts to a penalty on strikers, not neutrality." Id. at 382-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
337. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
338. Id. at 470.
339. Id. at 460. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the district court's
invalidation of the law, stating that "the evidence conclusively demonstrates that
the discrimination against plastic nonrefillables is not rationally related to the
Act's objectives." Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.
1979).
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mental goals set forth in the statute itself.3 40 Notwithstanding the
contrary evidence that the legislative ban on plastic milk containers was environmentally harmful, 3 4 ' the Court said that the test
was whether or not the legislature "could rationally have decided"
that the ban on plastic containers would promote environmental
well-being.3 4 2 The statute easily passed this deferential standard,
even though the Minnesota legislature had its environmental facts
backwards.
In United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,34 3 the Court
upheld an amendment to the Railroad Retirement Act that eliminated a windfall retirement benefit for some persons who had
qualified for both railroad retirement benefits and social security
benefits. 3 44 The Act preserved windfall benefits, however, for
others who qualified for both social security and railroad retirement benefits. 345 The Court held that the purpose of the amend346
ment was to "provide benefits to career railroad employees."
This justification did not appear anywhere in the statutory language or legislative history, and seems to have been a post hoc
rationalization suggested by the government attorneys defending
340. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 465-70. The state advanced four reasons why the ban on plastic nonreturnable milk cartons was rationally related to
the state's legitimate environmental goals: (1) the removal of popular plastic
nonreturnables would promote the use of environmentally superior containers;
(2) the quick ban would prevent economic loss to dairies before they switch to
the plastic containers; (3) the removal of plastic containers would save energy
and (4) the ban would reduce Minnesota's solid waste disposal problem. Id. at
465-69.
341. Id. at 463-64, 469-70. Clover Leaf Creamery presented "impressive" evidence that banning plastic containers would "deplete natural resources, exacerbate solid waste disposal problems, and waste energy." Id. at 463. Additionally,
the Minnesota Supreme Court found that plastic containers consume less energy
than paper containers, and would occupy less space in landfills and cause less
solid waste disposal problems than paper. Id. at 469-70 (citing Clover Leaf
Creamery Co. v. State, 289 N.W.2d 79, 82-85 (Minn. 1979)).
342. Id. at 466. "[T]hose challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently
based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the [legislature]." Id. at
464 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)).
343. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
344. Id. at 169-72.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 177. The Court also noted, however, that it is not necessary for
the legislature to "articulate its reasons for enacting a statute." Id. at 179 (citing
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)). Justice Brennan, in a dissenting
opinion, criticized this reasoning because after Flemming was decided, the "Court
has frequently recognized that the actual purposes of Congress . . .must be the
primary basis for analysis under the rational-basis test." Id. at 187 (Brennan,J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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the case. 3 4 7 Furthermore, the Court held that Congress could as-

sume that the protected group, those with a current connection to
the railroad industry, were more likely to be career railroaders
than the unprotected group.3 48 Since the purpose of the Act was
to protect career railroad workers, the classification was rationally
3 49
related to the legislative purpose.
Justice Brennan, who dissented, would have scrutinized the
law much more closely. The drafters of the bill were not members of Congress, but rather members of a Joint Labor-Management Negotiating Committee.3 5 0 Additionally, the district court
had found that the labor members of this committee had traded
off the interests of those who were no longer active railroaders or
union members (the plaintiff class) to achieve increased benefits
for their current members. 3 5 1 Obviously, this situation looks like
a naked preference. Justice Brennan suggested that Congress did
not realize that the language of the statutory amendment would
have this effect.3 5 2 Moreover, Congress could have been misled
by the Committee Report, which explained that one of the pur353
poses of the amendment was to protect all vested benefits.
Thus, if the Court had closely scrutinized the amendment, it
would have invalidated the law, either as a naked preference or
347. Id. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Recent Court decisions have required a statute to rationally support the actual legislative purpose, thus
preventing courts from substituting what they feel is an appropriate purpose. Id.
at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (law must "rationally further[] some legitimate, articulated state purpose" (emphasis added)) and Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam) (law must rationally further
"the purposes identified by the State" (emphasis added))).
348. Id. at 178 & n. I1 (Congress has used "current connection" test in past
to determine eligibility for retirement benefits, occupational disability, survivor
annuities and supplemental annuities).
349. Id. at 177-78.
350. Id. at 190 (Brennan,J., dissenting). Thus, the drafters were clearly not
in a position to articulate the congressional purpose behind the Act. Additionally, the members of the committee did not represent the interests of the plaintiff class, who were no longer active railroad workers or union members. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 191 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing unreported opinion of district court).
352. Id. at 193 (Brennan,J., dissenting). In this case, the Act was very complex, had been drafted by outside parties (who while explaining the Act to Congress made frequent and uncorrected misstatements) and no Congressman had
correctly stated the effect of the law. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 185 (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("Persons who already have vested
rights under both ... systems will in the future be permitted to receive benefits
computed under both systems .... " (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1345, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2 (1974); S. REP. No. 1163, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1974))).
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because the means did not advance the purpose of the law to protect all persons with vested benefits.
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,3 54 the Court upheld
a New York City Transit Authority regulation that excluded all
persons receiving methadone maintenance treatment from employment.355 The Court found that the purpose of the rule was to
promote safety and efficiency. 35 6 Even assuming that the exclusion was broader then necessary to promote that purpose, and
possibly even unwise, the Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause did not authorize it to interfere in such a policy decision. 35 7 Under the Cleburne methodology, however, the result
would have been different. Why was this particular group-methadone users-singled out? Justice White's dissenting opinion
pointed out that both the district court and the court of appeals
found that the group consisting of persons who had completed
one year in the methadone maintenance program were just as employable as members of the general population.3 58 Thus, excluding them was no more rational than excluding a percentage of
applicants by lottery. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, there
was strong reason to believe that the motivation for the methadone exclusion was a "special animus" against heroin addicts, a
group composed largely of the poor and racial minorities.3 59 It is
important to note that the Transit Authority had no similar exclusionary rule for persons suffering from alcoholism and mental ill354. 440 U.S. 568 (1979). Methadone, a narcotic, is used to break the addiction of heroin addicts by preventing a user from obtaining a "high" when
shooting heroin and also reducing the painful withdrawal symptoms. Id. at 57374.
355. Id. at 594.
356. Id. at 592. The New York City Transit Authority runs a system of public transportation including subways and buses. Id. at 571. Thus, certain jobs
involve the possibility of grave danger to either the worker or the public. Id.
Naturally, the exclusion of persons using narcotics and other illicit drugs from
these safety sensitive positions will promote the safety and efficiency of the public transportation system.
357. Id. at 592-94. The Court noted that the Transit Authority's policy may
be broader than necessary because some methadone users are qualified to work
at the Transit Authority in non-safety related positions, and individualized consideration of each applicant would be a wiser policy than a general rule. Id. The
Court stated that since the exclusion "does not create or reflect any special likelihood of bias" toward methadone users, however, the Constitution does not
authorize the Court to intervene. Id. at 593.
358. Id. at 603-04 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Beazer v. New York City
Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1037, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) and Beazer v.
New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 99 (2d Cir. 1977)).
359. Id. at 609 n.15 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting majority op., 440 U.S.
at 593 n.40).
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ness, which are "afflictions . . .shared by both white and black,
rich and poor." 3 60 These facts tend to show that the Transit Authority's exclusion of methadone users was economically and racially motivated, which would have been held to be an obviously
impermissible purpose if the Court had applied the stricter form
of rationality review.
Again, the point is not necessarily that these four cases were
decided incorrectly. Rather, the point is that they were not decided under the same standard as Moreno, Cleburne, Plyler and
Zobel. Therefore, two distinctly different standards are at work in
the Court's rational basis analysis, causing unpredictable results
depending upon which standard the Court chooses to apply in a
particular case.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Does equal protection's rationality review still have a justifiable role to play in American constitutional law? Obviously, the
doctrine has both theoretical and practical problems. Consider
rationality's balance sheet. On one side, its alleged liabilities:
1. Rationality review is not derived from the Constitution.
2. Rationality review is an undemocratic assertion of judicial control over legislatures.
3. Rationality review allows the personal values ofjudges to
trump proper legislative outcomes.
4. Rationality review is inconsistent and unpredictable.
On the other side, its alleged assets:
1. The requirement that laws serve a public purpose flows
directly from the structures of the Constitution.
2. The Constitution itself has taken some decisions away
from the people. The requirement that laws serve a public purpose is one such limitation on popular sovereignty.
3. Although the line between public values and private preferences is sometimes quite thin, should we not attribute
to judges the same capacity Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes attributed to every dog-the ability to distin360. Id. at 609 n.15 (White,J., dissenting). Further, the district court found
that approximately 2300 to 2400 of the Transit Authority's 47,000 employees
were attending a counselling service designed to help problem drinkers. Beazer
v. New York City Transit Auth., 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1056-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Thus, it was possible, and even likely, that problem drinkers constituted a larger
employment risk than methadone users. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. at 611 n.17 (White, J., dissenting).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992

65

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 1
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

4.

[Vol. 37: p. I

guish between being stumbled over and being kicked? 36 '
The inconsistency of rationality review is not due to intellectual confusion, but rather to very different theories
of government held by individual Justices on a changing
Supreme Court.

For every charge, a countercharge exists. One cannot prove
the legitimacy of rationality review, nor its illegitimacy. Nor,
under current Supreme Court precedents, can the doctrine be
closely and consistently cabined. It continues, however, to be a
doctrine with which prospective litigants and trial judges must
3 62
reckon.
361. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881).
362. With only one exception the Supreme Court has not decided a rational basis case in a plaintiff's favor since 1985. See Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal
Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989) (county tax assessment scheme that
allowed county to overvalue plaintiff's property for more than 10 years not rationally related to goal of assessing property at true current value). There continue to be, however, pro-plaintiff decisions in the lower federal courts. See, e.g.,
Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150 (9th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment reversed
to allow plaintiffs to show no rational basis for moratorium on new water hookups); Sullivan v. City of Pittsburgh, 811 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.) (requirement of conditional use permits for alcoholic treatment centers bore no rational relationship
to legitimate government purpose and was thus invalid), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 249
(1987); Deibler v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 790 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1986) (requirement that candidate for position of commissioner be nondelinquent taxpayer is
not rationally related to legitimate governmental interest); Perez v. Cucci, 725 F.
Supp. 209 (D.NJ. 1989) (invalidating policy of promoting and demoting police
officers because defendants failed to demonstrate rational relationship to legitimate government purpose), aff'd, 898 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1990); Long Island
Lighting Co. v. Cuomo, 666 F. Supp. 370, 422 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding Used
and Useful Act invalid because it bore no rational relationship to legitimate government purpose); Burstyn v. City of Miami Beach, 663 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. Fla.
1987) (invalidating zoning ordinance requiring special permits for adult congregate homes for elderly and mentally disabled, because ordinance bore no rational relationship to legitimate government purpose).
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